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STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GOVERNOR'S BLUE RIBBON FIRE COMMISSION

BEFORE THE GOVERNOR'S BLUE)	
RIBBON FIRE COMMISSION,)	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
)	12/04/03
Senator William Campbell, Chair)	San Bernardino, California
)	

CHAIR CAMPBELL: Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen, we'd like to call the order the second meeting of the Governor's Blue Ribbon Commission on fires. We'd like to begin with self-introductions. We'll start down at the left. Go ahead, Blair Springer. You're name and whom you represent.

MR. SPRINGER: Blair Springer, consultant to the Blue Ribbon Commission.

MR. SEDIVÉC: Jeff Sedivec, President of the California State Firefighters Association.

MR. PRATHER: Chip Prather, Governor's Emergency Council and the Fire Chief of the Orange County Fire Authority.

MR. BILL McCAMMON: Fire Chief, Alameda County Fire Department and President of California Fire Chiefs Association.

CHIEF BOWMAN: Jeff Bowman, Chief of San Diego Fire Department.

CHIEF ZAGARIS: Kim Zagaris, Chief, Governor's Office of Emergency Services.

MR. WILLIAMS: Jerry Williams, National Director of Fire and Aviation Management, U.S. Forest Service.

CHIEF BAMATTRE: Bill Bamattre, Fire Chief, Los Angeles, representing the California Metropolitan Fire Chiefs.

MR. MARTINEZ: Rick Martinez, California Office of Homeland Security.

MR. FREEMAN: Michael Freeman, Los Angeles County Fire Department, representing FIRESCOPE.

MS. TUTTLE: Andrea Tuttle, Director of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

1 MAYOR MURPHY: Dick Murphy, Mayor of the City of San Diego.

2 MR. JACKSON: Jimmy Jackson, representing Senator Dede Alpert.

3 MR. HANSBERGER: I'm Dennis Hansberger, Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, San
4 Bernardino County.

5 MR. LEWIS: Jerry Lewis, I have the privilege of representing this county a long ways away –
6 Washington, D.C.

7 MR. GERBER: I'm Robert Gerber, I'm with the Governor's Office of Emergency Services and
8 I'm serving as the executive secretary to the commission.

9 MR. DUTTON: Ted Dutton, representing Assemblyman Robert Dutton.

10 MAYOR VALLES: Judith Valles, Mayor of the City of San Bernardino.

11 MS. SMITH: Donna Smith, legislative counsel for Congresswoman Susan Davis from San Diego.

12 MR. MILLER: Michael Miller, Chief of Staff to Assemblywoman Christine Kehoe.

13 CHIEF ROPER: Bob Roper, Fire Chief, Ventura County, representing Judy Michaels, Chair of the
14 Ventura County Board of Supervisors.

15 MR. FUKUTOMI: David Fukutomi, Federal Coordinating Office with FEMA, Department of
16 Homeland Security.

17 MR. VERGA: Pete Verga, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, or Homeland
18 Defense.

19 MR. WILLS: Carroll Wills, California Professional Firefighters, representing Bob Wolf.

20 MS. DELGADO: Marilyn Delgado, here representing tribal governments.

21 MR. HAMILTON: I'm Larry Hamilton, I'm the National Director of Fire and Aviation for the
22 Bureau of Land Management, representing the Department of the Interior.

23 MR. WILEY: George Wiley with Speaker Herb Wesson's office of Sacramento.

24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much. I'd like to excuse the members of the Senate and
25 the Assembly. There's some little issue coming together in Sacramento right now, and we're unable to
26 leave. But if we could, Ladies and Gentlemen, if we'd stand for the Pledge of Allegiance to our flag lead
27 by Dennis Hansberger

28 [Pledge of Allegiance is recited.]

1 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I'd like to introduce Bob Gerber to talk a little bit about some of the
2 housekeeping things here for the members of the committee, and others.

3 MR. GERBER: Members of the commission, you can see in front of you, you have a number of
4 handouts. It was our endeavor to help you get organized as we go through this hearing process. We have a
5 three-ring binder in which you can place all of the material that you receive at the hearings, and we've
6 indexed them by the counties in which we were going to be holding the hearings. So any information that
7 we do get here, testimony that you can file in these three-ring binders. Also, you have an updated roster of
8 the membership of the commission. If you can take a look at that and see that we have all the accurate
9 information, I would appreciate it. And also you have an ID for the commission, also please take a look at
10 that. If there's any errors or any other issues, please bring them to me and we can correct them. The other
11 thing that I would ask is if there's anybody in the audience as well as any pagers or cell phones, if we could
12 put them on silent, that would be appreciated. Thank you.

13 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. My name is Bill Campbell, and I'm
14 the chair of the Governor's Blue Ribbon Fire Commission. The members of the commission and I
15 welcome you to this second hearing, and review of the state's efforts to combat the recent siege of
16 destructive wild land fires that engulfed many areas and damaged several communities throughout southern
17 California. As a former chair of the California State Legislature Select Committees on Fire Services, and
18 the Joint Committee on Fire, Police, Emergency and Disaster Services, I have personally witnessed the pain
19 and destruction caused by periodic wild land fires that have struck our state. During my 20-plus years in
20 the California legislature, I conducted several reviews of the steps taken by local, state and federal
21 agencies, as well as our private sector organizations, to prevent, combat and recover from the destructive
22 fires. We will learn how these resources are assessed. We will learn how they are dispatched and
23 coordinated, and we will learn how the different agencies exercise command and control and communicate
24 with one another, and what types of resources compliment one another. I propose that this commission
25 hold its third hearing on Wednesday, January 7, in the Ventura County area. And by the way, we will hold
26 one hearing in each of the five counties affected by the fires. This hearing will focus on pre-fire
27 management and fuel reduction programs, including community efforts such as those projects implemented
28 by local fire safe councils. I have also requested presentations be made on our previous recommendations

1 for strengthening our fire-prediction programs and to improving our wild land and wild land urban interface
2 firefighting capabilities, following the similar major complications that have occurred in the past.

3 A hearing in San Diego tentatively scheduled for Wednesday, January 21, and it is my hope that
4 this hearing will focus on after-action reviews conducted by other federal, state and local entities relative to
5 the October-November fires. The San Diego hearing will be following by a hearing on specific issues of
6 interest to the commission. For example, one issue of particular interest to me is interagency
7 communications. This will allow a greater depth of review in areas that members want to address, or
8 obtain answers to any remaining questions. If any member would like to recommend an area of specific
9 interest, please contact the commission's executive secretary, Bob Gerber. A hearing will be scheduled to
10 review and discuss the commission's draft report and propose recommendations prior to submission to the
11 Governor. We may choose to hold an additional hearing, or hearings, prior to this to consider any
12 additional concerns. At all hearings, individuals will be allowed to address the commission. Those who
13 wish to speak today, please see Mr. Springer at the end of the dais. Do you want to raise your hand again,
14 Blair? If you wish to submit written testimony instead, Mr. Springer can inform you of where to send that
15 information. Before we begin the presentations, I have asked Congressman Jerry Lewis, and we're
16 extremely fortunate in the state of California to have Congressman Lewis as chair of the Subcommittee of
17 Appropriations on the defense budget, who, along with Senator Feinstein, was able to make tremendous
18 efforts on behalf of the state of California. I've known him for, I was going to say when we both had dark
19 hair – but I think that's about it. That wasn't a long time. That was a few weeks ago. [Laughter.] Anyway,
20 we're pleased to have him here and what he and, particularly he and Senator Feinstein have done has been
21 a remarkable, remarkable achievement and will be hopefully finalized on Monday. So, Jerry, I'm going to
22 turn it over to you. Congressman Jerry Lewis.

23 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Thank you very much, Senator Campbell. Indeed it's a pleasure to be
24 with my friend from the state legislature again. I particularly appreciate your chairing this commission and
25 bringing all these people together to help us focus upon perhaps one of the greatest tragedies that we've had
26 in California in my lifetime. I particularly want to follow up on your comments regarding my work with
27 Diane Feinstein. I'm sorry that she can't be here today, but she has been a tremendous partner in this
28 process as we attempted to communicate to our committees, not just the challenge of our overdeveloped

1 and oft times under managed forests, but in turn to deal with the committees to try to respond to this
2 tragedy that we just recently experienced. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to make just a few points. I do not have
3 prepared remarks for the record, but the points are of high priority to those who dealt with the San
4 Bernardino County National Forest – the San Bernardino National Forest – and the way we responded to it.
5 We have some thoughts as well as suggestions and some questions for the commission.

6 First let me say that experts from almost every field dealing with the forest difficulties in the
7 country have outlined the fact in their mind's eye that the response to this tragedy in the San Bernardino
8 National Forest, by all the agencies that were involved, was very close to being ideal. If you're going to
9 draw a model as to how you put together the resources of the Guard and Reserve, local police and fire
10 agencies, the emergency management agencies, the forest service itself, it would be hard to suggest how
11 one could improve on the job they did before and during the rages of the fire itself. Having said that, there
12 is little doubt that we have learned a lot from the work that they have done, and it seems to me that the
13 reality that other areas were not nearly as well prepared, and because of that there was more difficulty in
14 dealing with the fires when they came. But also because of that I think we lost lives that we might not have
15 lost otherwise. With that in mind, it occurs to me that we really do need to address the possible
16 requirement in California of a major facility whereby, uh, to be developed, that could be used for training
17 and re-training of those people who cooperate together in tragedies like this. We all know of the endless
18 acres that we lost in this fire in the San Bernardino National Forest. We had all discussed the fact that there
19 was overgrowth, there were many too many trees per acre, and management had been impacted in many
20 ways, no small piece of that being the lack of adequate funding at the federal level to make sure we had the
21 numbers of people in place that were required. On the other hand, it's very apparent that when people
22 come together and apply their best, they can do a fantastic job. Query: is there a need, particularly where
23 this human development interface takes place with our national forest, to have some major facility whereby
24 we take those lessons learned, train people to work together, call upon them from time to time to come for
25 re-training and the like. It seems to me that there could be great benefit from such a development. It
26 further seems to me that it is an appropriate federal responsibility to play a roll in perhaps some of the
27 funding that relates to such training and re-training. So I ask that question in a broad sense for the

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1 commission, and would hope that over time, as we go forward with these hearings, to address it in great
2 detail.

3 Let me further say that, while I am very, very appreciative of the cooperative spirit that developed
4 here, all of us were set back by the reality that this problem was obviously before us and a problem, uh, a
5 crisis that was going to take place. Today in the San Bernardino National Forest, as we've lost thousands of
6 acres, and endless numbers of families are seeking new homes, 3,600 homes in California, a very
7 significant percentage of those in the San Bernardino National Forest. Dealing with that reality, Mr.
8 Chairman, it's important for us to attempt to think through better ways for us to deal with the challenges of
9 those people who had, themselves, deal with the aftermath and tragedy. How does the federal funding flow
10 when people have to replace their homes? What do you do about making sure that people are adequately
11 housed? We had, as you know, people by the thousands housed at a vacant Air Force base here locally.
12 That there are better ways. But indeed, we need to think through every step and just exactly what are the
13 appropriate roles for both the state, the local government, as well as the federal government.

14 Now going further, it seems to me that there's another whole array questions to be asked and
15 answered. How did we get here in the first place beyond a lack of management funding? We all are aware
16 of the fact that the drought had a huge impact upon the San Bernardino National Forest. A lack of water
17 for a period of about 5 years weakened the trees and thereby the bark beetle, which is always in the forest
18 naturally, has run amok in our forest. We have had, or have watched, literally millions of trees, not because
19 the winter was coming like in the east, but trees turning color almost like that, and you can see everywhere
20 you fly over endless numbers of trees that are not dying, or not just ill, they're dead trees, like match sticks
21 up in the air. The irony of this fire that we experienced was that as the Santa Ana winds came, they pushed
22 the fire ever closer to the landscape in the valley. A very significant number of our homes lost were not in
23 the mountains, but in the valley itself. And indeed as the Santa Ana's began to recede and the fire began to
24 take it's normal course going up the canyons, the weather changed, and we were able to get control of that
25 fire perhaps earlier than we might have otherwise. And what that left us with, Mr. Chairman, is this reality:
26 while we had a huge fires, lost many, many, many acres, and many, many homes, as you fly over the forest
27 today you'll see that most of those dead trees are still standing. It's pretty obvious that another tragedy is
28 just looking for somewhere to happen here in the San Bernardino National Forest. What do we deal with,

1 or do, if tomorrow lightening strikes in another location? And literary a conflagration that could run across
2 the entire forest. It's not just a question of how do you pay for it, how do you protect the people who life in
3 the forest, how do you lay the foundation to see that this kind of tragic circumstance doesn't develop again?
4 But from there, endless public policy questions. So, Mr. Chairman, for me it's very important for us to
5 recognize that all of us have a role at the local level, the state and the federal levels. From this point
6 forward, as we try to prepare for that next conflagration that will take place, let me urge the commission to
7 take one more step.

8 We've lost all these acres that I'm talking about, and we have literally lost most of the San
9 Bernardino Forest due to the bark beetle. How do we go about saving our forest post-tragedy, Mr.
10 Chairman? Do we have in place presently nursery programs, for example, to raise seedlings to begin to
11 replenish those acres that now are empty, but also prepare for the future? Clearly, if we started today
12 cutting down every one of those dead trees, it would take 6, 8, some suggest as many as 10 years to take
13 down all those trees. We do not need to wait 10 years to begin to rebuild the forest. If we're aggressive
14 about it, if we are cooperative at a local level, deal with everybody who has an interest in the forest,
15 whether we talk about people who are environmentalists who believe that the forest should not be touched
16 too much by any of us who want to recreate in the forest, for example, or if we're talking about people who
17 want to have maximum use of the forest for commercial and other purposes. The extremes, some would
18 suggest, but I would suggest people who are concerned about the future of our national forest. This could
19 become a model as to how we deal with tragedy first, and the aftermath of tragedy. And I would urge the
20 commission to help me struggle with these questions, and I'm looking forward very quickly to your
21 obviously very capable work, as well as the answers that will come forth from your work.

22 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Congressman, thank you. I want to thank you, though, for the money in the
23 budget. Would you talk a little bit about -- \$500 million dollars is nothing to sneeze at.

24 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Why are you worrying about money? [Laughter.]

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Well, I --

26 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Well, Mr. Chairman, I knew that you would follow up with that, and I
27 held it off for this reason. Two of my very dear friends have been involved with the forest for many, many
28 years. One, a fellow who is an expert in trees and has spent his lifetime managing people's properly with

1 trees, helping them save their own trees, make sure that they're healthy around their homes, and the like.
2 His brother was the fire chief in San Bernardino. Gene and Jerry Newcomb. Fabulous, fabulous talents.
3 Met with me five years ago regarding the problem facing us in the forest, the need for better management.
4 And they said, when tragedy comes then money will be available. But can't we do better than that?
5 Between that time five years ago and not so long ago, we had raised additional money to begin to try to
6 help with management problems in the forest. The total accumulation of that money was approximately
7 \$40 million dollars, and it took a lot of years and a lot of work to produce some of that funding and help the
8 forest service deal with problems that were immediate to them. The minute tragedy occurs – they call this
9 green money and red money. The green money is very, very easy to come by. The red money is the
10 money for management, the money you get before, the \$40 million dollars. Green money is money that
11 flows automatically when tragedy occurs. So the minute the fires were burning, in a supplemental meeting
12 Diane and I were talking out loud and I suggested \$500 million dollars, and they – the committee itself, in
13 response, producing for the Federal Emergency Management Agency \$500 million dollars – said before,
14 and I can say this to you, before God and everybody, this is only a down payment. We intend to see that
15 this is a down payment. But because FEMA does not do things like deal with erosion, they're not into
16 cutting trees in sizeable volume, etc., we decided to take some of that money, move it away from FEMA,
17 and put it more directly within the forest service for quicker action. But we felt comfortable in doing that,
18 Mr. Chairman, because it is only a down payment. The tragedy is huge. There is more money to come, but
19 that's only the oil to begin to solve the problem. The questions I was asking of the commission earlier are
20 really the heart of the success that your commission will have.

21 CHAIR CAMPBELL: What it yesterday or the day before the President signed the bill on forest
22 restoration?

23 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Yesterday.

24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yesterday. Could you comment just very briefly on that?

25 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Well, I think all of us are aware that there is, uh, there was an
26 initiative on the part of the President known as the Healthy Forest Initiative.

27 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That was it.
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1 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: That package, after much debate and discussion between the two
2 bodies, a compromise went through the conference just a short time ago, and as you indicate, just day
3 before yesterday the President signed the Healthy Forest Initiative. That initiative essentially is a package
4 of adjustments in the law that allows for us to begin to deal with the problems of human interface and the
5 national forest. It provides language that allows us to expedite many of the changes that will need to take
6 place in terms of the way we manage our forest, the kind of development that can take place in it, etc. It
7 expedites some of those laws that often cause the process to seem to drag its feet rather than to respond the
8 way we hoped government would respond in crisis circumstance. The Healthy Forest Initiative is a new
9 law that provides some of that expediting process. But it's only, absolutely, only the beginning. There's
10 no money attached to it. It suggests we can do a better job of managing our national forests. I can tell you,
11 Mr. Chairman, for those who worked on this legislation, much of their work in the closing moments was
12 done specifically because of the tragedy that they saw taking place in California. But with that does not
13 come the kind of money we need to development management plans and to go forward with saving the
14 forests – not just in California – but saving our forests across the country.

15 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Congressman, thank you very much and we're very honored to have you
16 here today and we're honored to have you back in Washington in your position there to help us out on this.

17 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Thank you.

18 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I am also honored that Governor Schwarzenegger has asked the
19 commission to conduct a review of this serious wild life disaster, and we owe it to California residents and
20 to our brave firefighters to pause after experiencing such a staggering loss of life and of property, and take
21 the time to ascertain what government at all levels, local communities, the private sector, and families and
22 individual residents, can do to improve our efforts in preventing fires from occurring. And when they do
23 erupt, to better control them to avoid such terrible destruction. The Blue Ribbon Commission conducted
24 it's first hearing on Thursday, November 13, 2003 in the Los Angeles area. The purpose of that inaugural
25 meeting was to provide the commission members with an overview and a chronological history of the fires
26 that besieged southern California. Today's hearing will focus on California's wild land and wild land
27 urban interface firefighting capability. The commission will be hearing presentations on what federal,
28 state, local, military, private sector resources are available to combat such fires. Is there any member of the

1 commission who would like bring up a particular issue or make a comment at this time before we begin the
2 testimony?

3 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Mr. Chairman, **(UNINTELLIBLE)**.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, certainly.

5 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Mr. Chairman, I neglected a couple of things that I intended to do.
6 My wife tells me constantly that I should prepare remarks, thereby I wouldn't forget things that are
7 important to be said and I explained to her that at San Bernardino High School I wasn't the best student, so
8 it's hard for me to read. [Laughter.] But in the mean time, I mentioned the forest service in a good deal of
9 my remarks. Gene Zimmerman is in the audience and he has played a very important role in helping us
10 with that fabulous coordination that we're talking about. Gene, if you'd stand, and remain standing for a
11 moment, if you would, Gene. Sitting next for Gene Zimmerman is a young lady from my office, Janet
12 Scott, who has worked very closely with all of these people in this effort as well. Janet, let people know
13 who you are. So if we have any problems relative to the commission's work, if you remember Janet Scott,
14 she'd be happy to give you our phone number. Thank you very much. Between those two people, I must
15 say, Mr. Chairman, the two other people here at the podium with us were most helpful in this cooperative
16 venture. I think you may know that Judith Valles and I are dear friends. You probably don't know that we
17 are high school classmates from beautiful downtown San Bernadino High School.

18 **(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER):** Who's older?

19 [Laughter.]

20 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: She's been constantly available and cooperative.

21 CHAIR CAMPBELL: You are much older than she is.

22 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: [Laughs] Of course, of course. And of course the chairman of the
23 Board of Supervisors, Dennis Hansberger, who's such a great partner in all these things, I appreciate very
24 much all that you've done. Thank you.

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you. Any member of the commission wish to make a statement at
26 this time?

27 MAYOR VALLES: I would like to make a statement.

28 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Judy.

1 MAYOR VALLES: And I don't the appropriateness of this statement, but I think it needs to be
2 said. I know this is not the time for finger pointing, but I think this is an important issue that must be
3 addressed. During the 1991 Malibu fires, we learned a great deal from that fire. And because we did, we
4 applied for a grant to do prescribed burns to talk about the interfacing between the national forest and the
5 urban areas. And we worked closely with the United States Fire Service to identify the specific areas to be
6 burned. However, we ran into some snags or some obstacles with the United States Fish and Wildlife, it
7 has to do with the protection of the habitat. Consequently, those prescribed burns were delayed, were
8 delayed considerably. What we have learned is that with some of the prescribed burns that we have had, it
9 did help to avoid spreading the fires, and I know I'm not speaking as a firefighter. However, I'd like to
10 read something to all of you. A grant was awarded to this county, or to the city, it wasn't much, it was
11 \$350,000, to create a fuel break between the city limits and the San Bernardino National Forest, which was
12 called the interface area. We met with the United States Fire Service and we cooperated on developing
13 prescribed burn plans to create what was called Age Class Mosaics and those of you that are in the
14 firefighting service probably understands what this means. However, we did run into some obstacles and it
15 had to do with the protection of the habitat, without going into any of the details. I think this is a serious
16 matter that probably should be addressed by this commission and recommendations be made so that we can
17 proceed with these prescribed fires and reduce the fuel to protect our communities that interface with the
18 National Fire Service. Thank you.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you, Mayor. That's one of the issues, then, we'll look at when we
20 hold the hearing on issues that we have not yet decided.

21 MAYOR VALLES: Thank you.

22 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That'll be one of them. Is there anybody else who wishes to make a
23 statement? If not, I'd like to begin the testimony. And, again, as I say, if there's individual who wishes to
24 testify that is not on the agenda, at the end of the formal testimony, if you'd contact Blair Springer and sign
25 up, we can have you make a presentation to the committee. It is our intent that at all hearings we will be,
26 we will have open public comment in case people feel there is something the commission should know that
27 we don't already know. We'll begin this morning with – excuse me, this afternoon – with Dallas Jones, the
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1 Director of the Office of Emergency Services, and Jim Wright, the Deputy Director of the California
2 Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. Dallas?

3 DIRECTOR JONES: Chairman Campbell and honorable members of the commission, it's indeed
4 a pleasure to be able to testify before you today. I do have a Powerpoint presentation. We have supplied
5 copies with text to each of the commissioners, but I would like to go through it and add some comment and
6 also start with a brief history of where we developed, and how, the emergency management and fire
7 mutual-aid systems in California. So if you would bear with me for a minute, I have to kinda turn a little
8 bit sideways so I can see the screen to walk you through this presentation.

9 The history of the mutual-aid system actually started back into the early war years and it gave the
10 president the power, or, uh, the governor the authority, over all civilian protection resources. And we
11 created the California State Disaster Council with fire service representation. The disaster council then
12 became part of the Governor's office, and also staff was provided to create the Office of Civil Defense. I
13 think a lot of the commission probably remembers that little seal at the bottom. In '50, currently we are the
14 only state with top to bottom mutual-aid packs, and the agreements, actually for mass mutual-aid in the
15 '50's, created all the counties and city governments, along with the state, agree we are the only city in the
16 U.S. that has that type of system. 1951, with a federal match from a grant from FEMA – at that time it was
17 called something different – the state acquired 100 triple combination pumpers and 29 heavy rescue units
18 that would be strategically located throughout the state of California with local government. These items
19 were purchased by state and federal money, put out in local government, and staffed at the time they were
20 needed by local firefighters. The apparatus we deployed across the state to allow what we call strike team
21 deployment. This is a section of a hundred thousand feet of six-inch aluminum pipe that was provided also
22 to the state, and we still use that to this day. When water mains break in mainly these major cities, we
23 bring in aluminum pipe and re-establish water. It was originally designed for fighting major fires, but we
24 still use that pipe today. These apparatus were actually put together strategically throughout the state so
25 that they could team up together to form what we currently today call strike teams. In addition, in 1961
26 communications problems had developed in the Bel Aire fire, prompted the State Fire and Rescue Service
27 Advisory Committee to acquire five communications units to support major incident management. The
28 State Disaster Council then became the California Emergency Council. And they also named the disaster

1 office to its current name, the Office of Emergency Services. This office is still retained to day in the
2 Governor's office.

3 The 1970 California southern fires proved to be one of the most destructive on record at that time;
4 13-day period, 770 structures, 500,000 acres, a lot of major problems related to mutual-aid incident
5 management, communications, and multi-agency coordination. The U.S. Congress at that time chartered
6 FIRESCOPE to be a project to involve the U.S. Forest Service and assisting all California fire agencies to
7 develop incident action and incident management systems. This is the father of the ICS that is currently
8 used throughout California, and soon to be adopted, we believe, throughout the nation.

9 The California Emergency plan has served as a basis of conduct for all emergency operations in all
10 jurisdictions of California. And the Fire and Rescue Emergency Mutual-aid plan is actually an extension of
11 that parent plan. In 1989 the Senate created the FIRESCOPE as a statewide program. Before then it was a
12 really a southern California program mainly to develop the ICS system and MACS to provide fire agencies
13 with a way to handle these multi-jurisdiction, multi-authority fires.

14 In 1991, with the East Bay Hills fire, SB 1841 was enacted, which established the Standardized
15 Emergency Management System to be utilized throughout California. Now that SEMS legislation actually
16 codifies the ICS mutual-aid, the Operational Area concept, and the MACS concept. This became operative
17 in 1996. Basically what gave its teeth was that all disaster costs are contingent upon the SEMS structure
18 being utilized for emergency response so that if any agency does not use the SEMS process, they may not
19 get reimbursed for the mutual-aid costs, or their cost of working on these disasters. The Incident Command
20 System, this is a representation of a very simple form of the Incident Command System. Very often people
21 think well, it's a real intricate, very difficult project to be used on these emergencies, and really, in fact, it's
22 a very basic concept. We use it actually in office for creating planning of parties and planning outings
23 because it really breaks things down into very simple elements of operations, planning, logistics, and
24 finance – all four of those areas. Now, on a major occurrence you may have 100 people working in the
25 finance section and further broken down into specific extra areas, but it really is a very simple concept and
26 it's very workable. It's currently being adopted, we believe, nationally, in a form, of course, being a
27 California system, it couldn't be called ICS. They're going to call it NIMS, National Incident Management
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1 System. And terrorism grants in the future [TAPE FADES] states using [TAPE FADES] the NIMS
2 system. And so, many states we believe will be –

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: If I may interrupt at this time. At the first meeting in your folder, we gave
4 you a glossary of terms. So if some of the acronyms get a little confusing, you can refer back to that and
5 you'll have an understanding of what we sometimes talk about in alphabet soup language.

6 DIRECTOR JONES: Thank you. Also, Senator, for a reminder, I'll try to explain the acronyms. I
7 do come out of the fire service, so it's kinda difficult sometimes to not revert.

8 The multi-agency coordination process is really, uh, came out of the multi-agency, multi-
9 jurisdictional fires of the 70's, and it was designed to be able to prioritize the allocation of scarce resources,
10 or resources, when you have multiple events or very, very large events. And this system actually brings
11 together the experts in the field. In this case, a fire being fire officers that have multiple resources under
12 their command to allocate all the resources using a standardized matrix so that it takes the subjectivity out
13 of the process, because in these emergencies obviously resource allocation becomes very sensitive. And
14 this system is used in these major incidents here in California quite effectively and has for many years, and
15 you can, uh, when people ask how we determine which of these incidents get the resources as they become
16 available. This is the process and system that used. The experts actually make the decision, not based on
17 subjective evaluation.

18 Now I'd like to actually go into the mutual-aid plan itself. The basic tenants of the mutual-aid plan
19 are self-help and mutual-aid. Self-help is fairly simple. It's fire and rescue officials have the basic
20 responsibility for preparing their communities for potential threats. In plain language what that means, it's
21 your community's responsibility to get your community ready to deal with the problems at hand. The fire
22 and rescue officials must also pre-plan emergency operation, to try to affect efficient utilization of their
23 available resources, and these pre-plans can include mutual-aid threat zone planning, automatic aid
24 agreements, and the plans for utilization of other locally available resources. What this means is that local
25 government can make agreements with their surrounding jurisdictions, and we have almost entirely
26 throughout California what we call boundary drop agreements – these are automatic aid agreements so that
27 one [TAPE FADES] may run their resources into another community's jurisdiction because there's an
28 arbitrary boundary line in between. One may be closer so they can drop that boundary in one station's

1 jurisdiction, come in and cover it. And those are all the purview of the local government agencies. They
2 need no permission from state government or anybody else to do those kinds of agreements. And that
3 works also with private and governmental entities, as we've seen in so many of the military facilities. They
4 have local agreements to assist the surrounding jurisdictions back and forth for responding to problems on
5 the bases and outside the base jurisdiction. But these are considered local agreements and they are not part
6 of the state mutual-aid plan, necessarily.

7 The responsible agency will reasonable exhaust all of their local resources before requesting
8 mutual-aid, and that's really kind of a key. It's not a situation where it's an arbitrary rule. It's clearly we
9 encourage local agencies and communities to call for help at the soonest time they believe they'll be
10 reasonably necessary. But that is to say it's not to allow a local jurisdiction to marshal their resources at
11 home while everybody else comes in and takes care of their jurisdiction. It's really a, if we're going to
12 come to your community, you need to come to ours. So we need those resources available at a reasonable
13 level, and that's really part of the plan and the understanding between all parties. Another important factor
14 is, no party to the mutual-aid will be required to unreasonably deplete its own resources in furnishing
15 mutual-aid. So that each local community has the responsibility of determining what they need to remain
16 in their community to provide as prudent a coverage as possible. Clearly, in these major events, all of our
17 agencies throughout California dig deep, come up to try to help their neighbors because quite frankly, it
18 could be their turn the next time in the barrel. And we've seen in California year after year we have very
19 large fires and it is really, we are dependent on each other to provide the kinds of coverage necessary.

20 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I want to add that most of these also include law enforcement with the same
21 kind of mutual-aid issues.

22 DIRECTOR JONES: Yeah, when I speak of mutual-aid, our agency is responsible for
23 coordinating Law Enforcement, Fire, Coroners, and Communications Mutual-aid statewide. So, those are
24 the areas we work and these are the basic parameters for all of those areas. Although in some of the other
25 areas, you don't have the reciprocity. Not all communities have communication abilities that all of them
26 do, but the basic tenants are still there. The other thing is that the local agencies are responsible for
27 providing logistical support for incoming agencies and also, they remain in charge of the incident. Very
28 key understanding is that local agency retains command of the incident. Now they may go into what we

1 call a unified command, or they may chose to turn it over to another command team. But it is their
2 responsibility and it is their jurisdiction, it is their incident. And that's a real key term; this is a bottom up
3 system. This is not a top down system. And quite frankly, that's what makes it work. Because the people
4 closest to the problem are the ones in charge. The emergency mutual-aid plan – this is basically the
5 definition, and it's applicable to local emergencies, state emergencies, or state of war emergencies, or
6 compatible mutual-aid agreements between parties.

7 Now I'd like to go into, if you'd allow me, how the mutual-aid system actually works. In
8 California, the premise of SEMS is an operational area. Now an operational area is a geographical
9 boundary of each county. So in California, it's very easy, we have 58 counties so we have 58 operation
10 areas. And there's good reason for that. The authorities in that county reside there. The coroner, the
11 sheriff, the fire chief – they're responsible for their agencies in that geographical area. So it wasn't that we
12 just picked counties because it was a good boundary line, it's because there are actual authorities that reside
13 in that operational area. Each of those operational areas have a coordinator of all the cities, the county's
14 facilities, the fire districts, the school districts – they all work together to do their emergency planning
15 within that operational area. Now, for mutual-aid purposes, we've divided the state into six mutual-aid
16 regions and they're represented here. And they may be as few as six counties, or as many as 16, but they
17 are operational areas. Now, the peers in that region elect a Regional Coordinator, for both Law and Fire
18 Mutual-aid, so that that elected representative is the regional mutual-aid coordinator. They are not an
19 employee of OES, they are in most cases a county fire chief, probably a county sheriff, in some areas it's a
20 city fire chief, or in a lot of areas it's a CDF fire chief because they have contract authority. But
21 nevertheless, these are local government representatives that coordinate with the mutual-aid, within that
22 region. They're responsible there for maintaining the status and updating and activating the regional plan,
23 and so it's kind of a thankless job with no pay. But it's a very effective plan, because here again, they're
24 closest to the problem.

25 As I said before, it's a bottom up plan. And resource requests, when they come in, they come in
26 from local fire officials, they go to the operational area, which is, remember, the county boundary lines, and
27 then it would go to our region, one of those six. Now if the local fire officials request assistance and it's
28 handled within that county, we never hear of it because it's not necessary. We don't need to know

1 everything that's going on in the state and many, many areas of the state we have mutual-aid being received
2 and requested on a daily basis. Your busier counties, they cross boundary lines, they mutual-aid back and
3 forth, and you're all very aware of that. So it's a very, very good system. If the operational area, or that
4 county, has exhausted their resources, they can then go to the region. And that's where that elected
5 regional representative, generally a county fire chief, would then work within the entire region, maybe as
6 many as six or many more county areas, to provide the resources. Again, we don't get too involved in that
7 because it's a regional matter, and as long as resources are taken care of in that region, it doesn't really
8 need to get kicked up. Now we're aware, and we start monitoring because we may hit a threshold and need
9 regional support from outside that region. But once it goes outside that region, then the state fire and
10 rescue coordinator gets involved to make sure that we're adequately manning the incidents and the requests
11 that are coming into that region that's affected. The reason that's important, many people think it's like the
12 old football game, everybody out long. It isn't. When we move fire equipment, there are still heart attacks,
13 regular fires going on, on a daily basis in all of your communities, so we can't take all of the fire
14 suppression forces out of any area of the state with any kind of conscience because people would be dying
15 because of a lack of response. So, it's more like a checkerboard. These resources are pulled out, not by
16 random but by pre-plan so that areas still have reasonable coverage even though some of the stations may
17 not have the forces in play. Now many departments backfill them with off duty personnel to man reserve
18 apparatus, or other ways, but that's how the system works. It's not everybody just goes to the fire, even
19 though the firefighters would just love to do that, quite frankly. Having been one, I – see Freeman here? I
20 have to admit; I think we did it a couple times.

21 There's two primary agreements in California that are used for mutual-aid, and not to get too
22 technical, but the master mutual-aid agreement is really the voluntary – it has two components – one's
23 voluntary and the other is mandatory, basically obligatory, and that's only under a state of war. The
24 governor has the ability to reach out and command local government forces to move in the event of war – a
25 very unusual situation, I might say. The California Fire Assistance Agreement provides that when we get a
26 big fire going someplace and we need mutual-aid resources, then local government is basically on the hook
27 for the first 12 hours. It's not reimbursed. But after that 12 hours, then they are funded and paid for
28 through the agreement, the California Fire Assistance Agreement, and that's where it really converts then to

1 assistance by hire. And because, quite frankly as you well know, you can't take all of your fire forces and
2 send them to all these big fires. You would bankrupt local government if you didn't have a mechanism to
3 pay for some of those costs because many of the communities have to backfill with personnel to man their
4 existing stations when they're sent out on these kinds of fires. So those are the basic two types of
5 agreements that are used in the mutual-aid system.

6 Now, we have other methods of mutual-aid assistance that are used here. We talked about mutual-
7 aid assistance by hire, and local agreements. Any of the localities can agree with each other to provide,
8 either for pay or for free, assistance to their agencies. The cooperative fire protection agreement is actually
9 a four-party agreement and it's made up of California Department of Forestry, the U.S. Forest Service, the
10 National Park Service and the Bureau of Land Management, and they have cooperatively agreed to move
11 resources back and forth and reimburse each other for cost when necessary, and they've negotiated the rates
12 of pay and all of that. Then the agreement for local government fire suppression is one that we're a party
13 to, we used to call it the five-party agreement that OES, on behalf of local government, is also a signatory.
14 We've worked out the rates of pay and so they also move back and forth under that agreement.

15 The Interstate Civil Defense Disaster Compact is the master agreement that all of the states agreed
16 to back in the 1950's. And this was when we talked about civil defense. This is also the compact that
17 allows law enforcement officers to cross the state boundaries when they're in hot pursuit. It allows the
18 governor from one state to send resources into another state and the rates of pay will be paid, it's a
19 compact, a written agreement. We also have a subcompact with the states of Arizona, California, Idaho
20 Nevada, Oregon and Washington, that's more specific and defines more of the rates of pay and some of
21 those issues. There's another compact that's in the United States that EMAC, Emergency Management
22 Assistance Compact. This compact was a result of what used to be called the Southern States Compact.
23 It's administered by the National Emergency Management Association. It isn't very often used because
24 fire resources don't really flow through that interstate compact, even though a number of states have agreed
25 to it. The difference, though, is we've had our legal people at it, is that under EMAC you have to have a
26 disaster declaration, whereas under the state's compact, you don't require a declaration of emergency, you
27 can just state to state move resources by agreement between the governors. The other is under the current
28 compact that we use, international agreements are possible. There is no provision in EMAC for making

1 agreements. Now, we have in California agreements with Mexico. In fact, just earlier this week we had
2 resources in Mexico fighting a fire that was potentially going to burn into the southern part of California.
3 It's a very often occurrence that we work cross border with our partners.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That wasn't retribution on their part for the fire that went into Mexico.

5 DIRECTOR JONES: We thought that at first, Senator. [Laughs.] Uh, the other is a tort liability.
6 There's a main difference, another main difference, under tort liability, under the current compact, the
7 sending state is the one that maintains the responsibility for tort. In other words, they would use the
8 California tort system as the basis for payment of claims if we send somebody into another state. Under
9 EMAC, it's the opposite. The receiving state – and this become somewhat tenuous when you get into some
10 of the areas of workers' compensation and disability and death benefits and retirement, lots of the issues
11 that haven't really been worked out clearly to our satisfaction. So we are not a signatory to EMAC and
12 those are some of the reasons. Eventually it's our hope that those issues will be resolved, and that may be
13 something that we can work with but until they are, we've urged caution in that regard. At this time --

14 CHAIR CAMPBELL: You mean to tell me that some of the states are willing to go under the
15 California tort system?

16 DIRECTOR JONES: [Laughs.] So far there's quite a few of them that are.

17 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That was a rhetorical question.

18 DIRECTOR JONES: Yes. [Laughs.] At this time I'd like to talk a little bit about the state of
19 California OES resources. The chief of our fire branch is the State Fire and Rescue coordinator, so his job
20 is to be the coordinator statewide to work with the Regional Coordinators and FIREScope to work on and
21 maintain our system. And the other item is that our agency also maintains, because of SEMS, the ability to
22 mission task all other state agencies during times of disaster so that we can call upon our other partner
23 agencies in the state to come in and assist whatever the problem may be. We have, within our own
24 abilities, engines, trucks, personnel incident management support teams and technical specialists, and GIS
25 support. On the World Trade Center, we sent GIS support and donations management experts to assist that
26 effort. Same thing with Oklahoma City. We did some of the GIS mapping of the structure that was blown
27 up there in Oklahoma City, our GIS people actually took the building plans pre-disaster and took then the
28 seating plans from the offices and determined where these may be in the rubble field. And it was very,

1 very well received and it was one of the earlier responses with GIS into the United States. And since then
2 it's grown tremendously from those earlier days to what we now have two portable trailers that we can send
3 out and do actually field mapping for both local, state and federal agencies. It's a very burgeoning field.
4 The communications resources that we talked about a little bit earlier, we have support units that can be
5 deployed mobily and we have repeater sites that we can take out. Sometimes a repeater site will get burned
6 over in one of the fires, we can go out and replace it. We have six satellite trailers that are both capable.
7 These were as a result of the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989. The legislature saw fit because
8 communications went down. We're tied in with each county of the state of California with our own
9 satellite system. We have these portables that we yearly take out on both state, federal and local incidents
10 in the wilderness and re-establish both hard line and data terminals. This was a system that was, like I say,
11 developed in 1989. We also have portable radio and cell phone caches that we routinely deploy on both
12 major fire incidents and planned events.

13 As far as OES resources themselves, we have a fleet of engines, water tenders, heavy rescue units,
14 swift water caches, portable pumps, and of course you saw the picture of the aluminum pipe.

15 We have 110 engines strategically located throughout California and staffed by local government
16 fire personnel. So that at any time we can call on them and they become then a state resource and we
17 provide the overhead and man them. We had 102 of those engines deployed on these fires. We have 12
18 water tenders. That's a fairly new program. They're in the field. We had some of them deployed on the
19 fires, they're a 2,000-gallon tank. They're very well received in the fire community. We have the OES
20 communication support vehicles, we have six of those, six of the satellite units. We also started a program
21 with Cal-Trans. In partnering with them, they have two that use our system but they purchased the vehicles
22 themselves so we can mission task them if need be for these disasters. And of course portable radios and
23 repeater sites.

24 Now the engines, this is kind of a break down of the regions. I want to just kind of represent where
25 these fire engines are placed, and also the water tenders. It's our hope that in the future we get more water
26 tenders, but you can see they're fairly well distributed statewide. The idea being they're formed up into
27 teams of five, with a chief officer, and then deployed on these major events.

28

1 The other thing we didn't talk much about was also incident command teams, incident overhead
2 and ICS qualified and specialized personnel. Both local government and state government will get requests
3 in, sometimes from out of state, sometimes from in-state, to staff overhead positions. In other words, you
4 get a major fire going, you have to rotate people through on these teams, so we'll have to fill some of them
5 out.

6 These are the types of resources that we have in California. We talked earlier about resource
7 typing being very important. When you order something you need to have the right one show up. This is
8 something that hasn't been done nationally. California is the only state, really, that has typed the resources.
9 These just happen to be the types of fire trucks that we have in California. And you'll see the difference
10 almost literally by the little pictures of the trucks. We've got 3,554 large Type Ones, and those are the ones
11 that are generally used in the urban areas. And at the bottom you'll see on the Type Fours, these are small
12 rigs that can get in very narrow, windy or steep inclines that are used in conjunction with the Type Threes
13 in many of your more rural areas. So you can see how important typing is. If you're on an incident and
14 you say send me a fire truck and you get one of the Type Ones, that because of the wheelbase isn't able to
15 drive up a driveway or an incline, it becomes very critical. Now this has happened over and over again
16 throughout the United States at various events. A few years back Florida had a big fire and it was down in
17 some of the swampier areas and they ordered up a whole bunch of strike teams of bulldozers. Well, there
18 are different pad sizes on bulldozers and if they're not wide enough, they sink down. So they got some
19 resources in there, they weren't suitable, and ended up re-ordering. And so you can see the kinds of time
20 that are sometimes lost. A total in California is around 5,500 local government engines, so that we're able
21 to form up about 200 to 250 strike teams, theoretically.

22 The resources in this state, these are the mutual-aid, this is kind of a breakdown. The key to this
23 slide, I think though, is the 900-plus city, county, special districts involved here, fire departments, with
24 about a total of 62,000 firefighters in the state of California. So you can see the inter-governmental, inter-
25 jurisdiction challenges that are there when you bring in mutual-aid resources from throughout the state. We
26 are very blessed in California. We have standardized firefighting training that allows us to move resources
27 from one agency to another, almost flawlessly. It's a real testament, I believe, to the system that's been
28 developed over many, many years.

1 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Dallas, would you comment – we have a great working relationship with
2 Nevada, particularly on mutual-aid.

3 DIRECTOR JONES: Yes.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: But we sent, uh, how many strike teams to Montana this year?

5 DIRECTOR JONES: We sent 20 engines to Montana last year, and quite a few to Wyoming
6 earlier. In fact, it was so successful the governor of Colorado ended up buying 10 of his own engines and
7 starting a program similar to ours, so I think it was well worth doing.

8 The reason that we know this is the stress inventory. Our fire branch conducts an inventory
9 statewide so that we are always able to know where the resources are and also to be able to capture as we
10 have turnover in qualified personnel **[Side A, Tape 1 of 3 ends.]**

11 **[continuing with Tape 1, Side B, mid-sentence w/Chair Campbell]**

12 DIRECTOR JONES: . . . OES and multiple agency coordination has been, I think, fairly well
13 known. These are three of the events that are fairly well known that we kind of hone these skills on. The
14 incident response coordination works to assist and work with all levels of government in doing any of
15 these. We're able to task state agencies, such as our partners in forestry, California Army guard, helicopter
16 support, the mass units through the air national guard. Also with contract aviation, if it comes to that, that's
17 usually a pretty far fall back because our forest service brothers generally handle most of that for
18 California. The other is on the mission tasking authority, I wanted to say that it's contingent upon – and
19 this is another issue we have with the MACS mutual-aid – is in California, we, we, the Bible, so to speak, is
20 the closest available appropriate resource and that's how we mission task. We don't say well, just because
21 we're from this agency we think we ought to do it. If it's the closer resources of CDF, we send them. If
22 it's the guard, we send them. If it's the highway patrol, we send them. And so it's really contingent upon
23 work product and not on, say, institutional or the pride of the course, so to speak, and that's critically
24 important I think when you get into a lot of these measures, that time is important.

25 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Excuse me, uh, Mr. Chairman?

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Go ahead, Congressman.

27 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: Dir. Jones, you mention contract aviation. It has been suggested by
28 some who are dealing with these recent crises that there are some limitations in the law that would suggest

1 that assets that are available in the private sector by way of contract or otherwise, must all be used or
2 exercised. The opportunity must be exercised before military assets can be drawn forward. Do you know
3 of such a limitation in the law? Is there a problem there that we need to address? I intend ask that of
4 General Monroe later, if I'm able to stay. But if both would address the question, it would be interesting.
5 Do you know of such a problem with the law?

6 DIRECTOR JONES: It's my understanding that there is such a law, and that it is, uh, it was based
7 on deploying civilian resources prior to the government coming in. It was a contracting legislation, as I
8 understand. When I referred to the military units here in California, they're under the guard, we can
9 resource them. It's when we bring in from out-of-state military resources that we run into the problems.
10 Yes, and aircraft is, uh, even the MAFFS units.

11 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: It was suggested by one of my colleagues that literally there were
12 military assets on the ground available, perhaps even in the air, and they were told to back off of elements
13 of the fire in San Diego because there were still contact assets available. Frankly, I can understand how the
14 law might have been developed over time that would protect the private sector, but when you've got a
15 crises like this and you've got assets that are in the region and could be called up, they just flat out ought to
16 be available. So I'd be interested in knowing if you think the law needs to be massaged – not necessarily
17 now, but over time – and I'll be asking General Monroe the same question, if I'm able to remain.

18 DIRECTOR JONES: Clearly, uh, just to clarify first for a minute, the issue I believe was raised
19 with the **MAFF's** unit, so we've got nationwide – there are eight MAFFS units, two in California's
20 Channel Islands, and so those become – they're a state asset. It's, uh, the problem really was that we were
21 trying to access the six that were out of state, cause we had deployed our military resources here in
22 California that are trained and equipped, we had done that already, and it was trying to access them through
23 U.S. Forest Service that we were having the problem, and yes, that clearly needs to be changed. Because
24 quite frankly, our experience in California is even our own **MAFF's** unit have often not been available
25 because they have been out of state on a federal mission fighting fires. And that's okay. You know, if
26 they're going go to go to work just like this time, eventually we ended up with all eight in California, and
27 Colorado had some fires break. But we believe, strongly, that if they're needed, they should be just like
28

1 any other resource, there should be no bars to the fire ground commanders being able to access them
2 smoothly into the system.

3 CONGRESSMAN LEWIS: As you know, I've spent a lot of time worrying about how we use
4 military assets, and we have many deployed around the world, but in a case like this where you have assets
5 that are designed for firefighting purposes, you've got a crisis on hand, to have a legal stumbling block is
6 just not acceptable. So as we discussed this, I hoped to get help from you regarding changing that law, if
7 need be.

8 DIRECTOR JONES: Sure. Our office would love to work with you, Congressman, on that.
9 Because this isn't the only fire that we've had that type of situation where we would have liked to access
10 that resource, but quite frankly couldn't.

11 MR. VERGA: Mr. Chairman, if I could for just a minute, uh, from the Department of Defense.

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, sir.

13 MR. VERGA: It would be very, very interested in some specific examples, historic if necessary,
14 if you could provide where the federal military forces were inhibited from providing a response to a request
15 from another government agency due to some provision in the law.

16 DIRECTOR JONES: We'll research that and input as much we can. I'd like to speak a little bit
17 about the California Incident Command Certification System. This really goes to the heart of much of what
18 we've been doing. It's a really a minimum certification and qualifications that are necessary because of
19 safety. Now these are generally command officers that are sending, so to speak, combat troops into battle.
20 You need to have them trained and to notice the safety issues that are involved in these fires. Because quite
21 frankly, having spent a lot of time on these fires, we could have lost entire strike teams of firefighters in a
22 number of locations had it not been for the heads-up of their command officer, so this is a very important
23 element, I believe, of our systems in California. And also it's problematic with bringing personnel from
24 out of state that we're not sure of their qualifications. Now that might be all right for some deployments,
25 but when you get into command and control, that's where it gets very problematic. So this system has been
26 developed. The analogy I use is, we wouldn't think of sending troops into combat without some training,
27 and so this really is pretty much the same analogy. The reason this was developed, and it was identified
28 after the Calabasas Action Report that this was really needed, because command decisions were made and

1 quite properly, probably shouldn't have been. And so, define that we should develop minimum training
2 standards for officers, and define the qualifications and the experience that's required for personnel to man
3 these positions in this ICS system. And then in November of 2000 the State Board of Fire Services, and the
4 FIREScope Board of Directors adopted this, and then of course in May of last year, it was implemented
5 by state fire marshals in our office statewide. Now, it does have an element of what we call grand-
6 fathering, you can apply because of your experience and prior training and be grand-fathered into those
7 positions, but it is a system that has to be used. The forest service has a similar system they call "carding,"
8 where you actually physically have to carry a card, and you cannot be deployed on some of these fires if
9 you don't have that card. Now, last year, I think, we were faxing information into other states so that our
10 resources could be deployed to prove that they were properly trained for deployment on some of these fires,
11 because numerous fires, uh, they've done after action reports and some of the accidents occurred because
12 of improper training or qualifications.

13 Ah, recommendations, my favorite – now some of these sound like they're self-serving, but they're
14 actually not. Because the fire fleet, as I mentioned earlier, is really put out into local government. They're
15 able to use that fleet, when there's a breakdown or they have a major fire, they're able to stop it and use it.
16 So it's a good thing for local government. It's even a better thing, though, for the state of California. What
17 I'm recommending here is expanding the water tender fleet. Same thing – we purchase them for a state
18 asset like we have the 12, put them out in local government, but be able then to call them up when
19 necessary on these major fires. So it really doesn't become our asset until we have a major emergency and
20 need the asset. The other is expanding the command nets by installing additional mountaintop repeaters. I
21 now it sounds very simple, and it is, but it is costly. We have 28 repeater sites throughout California on
22 mountaintops. If we doubled them up, put another one on there, we would double our ability for command
23 nets statewide. CDF has similar sights, and we could double up the two and end up with four different
24 command nets that we believe would be a very cost effective way of improving statewide communications.
25 And I'm speaking of primarily statewide issues, not necessarily that they're germane to any local
26 government's jurisdiction, but I think would be an assistance for every locality throughout the state. The
27 communications support units that we mentioned earlier, many of those need replacement and because of
28 budget problems we haven't been able to replace them as much as we'd like. The Oasis Communication

1 System, that system doesn't only get deployed in fires, it connects all 58 counties with a reliable
2 communications system and it was put in place in about 1989. The ability to transfer data, and much of the
3 mapping that's done by GIS in the wilderness, is shot up to the satellite, down to our office, massaged, and
4 then sent back. And so the ability to have faster speed cone activity – and trust me, my granddaughter is
5 my tech expert on this, so my understanding is very limited – would be a great benefit to all of the services
6 and emergency management in general statewide. The other is to integrate the **MIRPS** which is a
7 computerized system used by Forest Service and CDF. We would like to plug in the California Fire and
8 Rescue mutual-aid system into that system, and we need some funds to do that, to integrate so that we are
9 for sure marrying up all the federal, state and the local resources in an automated system, and we think that
10 would be very beneficial. Those are preliminary recommendations. I'm sure I'll have some more for you
11 as the deliberations go on. Well, in fact, one that I've been thinking about for some time. I wasn't sure I
12 should put it here, but I'm going to bring it forward.

13 On the issue of aircraft, it's been in my experience over many, many years that we need, I believe,
14 nationwide to develop the U.S. Forest Service air attack group as we have in California. We've been the
15 model in so many other things. We have a fleet of aircraft in the state of California, maintained and
16 operated by Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, that does water-dropping helicopters and fixed
17 wing. There is no reason why the federal government could not take new airframe military aircraft, convert
18 it for retardant dropping, and move them around regionally throughout the United States during the
19 different fire seasons, because they are different. And it seems to me that would be the most cost effective
20 way of providing these retardant dropping capabilities. And I understand there's a lot involved in that, but
21 it sure seems to me that would be the better answer because then you'd be using aircraft designed for that
22 purpose and more deployable and more usable, and I think more cost effective.

23 With that, I'd like to close, and I thank you very much for your attention and I hope we didn't
24 suffer you with overkill on the slides. Thank you.

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Dallas, thank you very much, and if there are any questions, before we get
26 the questions, if there are, from the commission members, the issue of communications is one that I
27 mentioned in my opening statement that we want to take a good hard look at. We know that there is
28 difficulty communicating between, sometimes between the different agencies, but mostly between the

1 different levels of government. I think some of the problems with air attack is that we can't communicate
2 with some of the federal aircraft, and I think that's the issue we're going to hear a little bit about probably
3 again today, but we're definitely going to have a hearing on that particular issue, on communications in
4 general. So I appreciate your recommendations there.

5 Any member of the commission have a question for Director Jones. Yes?

6 MARILYN DELGADO: Dallas, hi. I'd like to know if, when you discussed the Senate Bill 27 on
7 the FIRESCOPE, does that bill also include inclusion of tribes? In that law, or is that something that we
8 might want to look at?

9 DIRECTOR JONES: That's something I think we should look at. In fact, the whole issue of
10 tribes and mutual system, we've over the years had a fairly effective working relationship with the tribes,
11 but it hasn't been formalized, and it's only of recent vintage, I think, that the federal government has taken
12 more of a position of allowing the state to work more directly with the tribes. Because quite frankly in the
13 years past, it was kind of like they're a sovereign nation, there are responsibility, Indian Affairs will take
14 care of that and you keep you hands off. So we were kind of always going a round the corner in dealing
15 with the tribes. Now it's more direct. In fact, some of the terrorism funding is earmarked and supposed to
16 be passed down to the tribal governments. So, I think it's a great idea to formalize much more interaction
17 with the mutual-aid system.

18 MARILYN DELGADO: Right, and I think it's very critical that we insure that we include tribes in
19 the planning processes, as well. And I think we brought this up at the last meeting is that, you know, when
20 those fires on the reservations start, of course they can start on the reservation and then spread throughout
21 the counties, as well. So I think it's very critical that the tribes are also part of the planning processes and
22 included in that when we develop this.

23 DIRECTOR JONES: I think you can go one step further. You need to be part of a planning
24 response and recovery process.

25 MARILYN DELGADO: Right, right. Thank you. I wanted to know if, also, on the map that you
26 did of the, uh, what was it called? The mutual-aid area, geographical areas? Um, in those regions, I
27 believe there are six regions, or seven regions? Are the tribes included in those regions also, or are they,
28 you know, cause I know that we deal with the 58 counties, but are they also included in those?

1 DIRECTOR JONES: Yeah, because they're included within the geographical boundaries of the
2 counties, they are included as far as local government allows the inclusion, or works with them. It's more
3 like a cooperative relationship between cities. It's not formalized, but they are part of that operational area.
4 And it's our expectation that they be included and work with them.

5 MARILYN DELGADO: Right. Okay, thank you.

6 DIRECTOR JONES: You're welcome.

7 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, go ahead.

8 **(UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER):** Perhaps some later speaker is going to address this,
9 but you mentioned – you gave us a rundown of all, from the bottom up, of each of the groupings, local,
10 regional, so on. There're a number of layers here. But it is not clear to me, and has been the question that
11 our constituents asked beginning on the day the fire started was, how quickly and by what process do those
12 requests for assistance get taken care of so that you get to the next available level? San Diego, obviously,
13 was several days late, already had many of our resources, as many as could be spared, into the other fires.
14 We couldn't get those back. We needed to have replacements for them as soon as possible. You indicated
15 within the state how boundaries, often somebody's closer across a boundary than one of your own supplies.
16 We were very privileged to have firefighters from northern California, of course in particular the gentleman
17 who lost his life. It is very clear to us in San Diego that Tucson is closer than San Francisco. Is there
18 anything that says we have to exhaust all of, having made calls to all of the levels within California before
19 the regional levels beyond, and the southwest, although I understood the center was in Boise, and I'm not
20 clear from your presentation how that works, but at what point could someone have gone, gotten to the
21 Tucson – let's use that as an example cause it's the closest other city, except for Las Vegas, which
22 obviously had fires and were probably already tapped – um, how quickly did those requests go out and how
23 quickly were the responses to come in from them that they had resources available?

24 DIRECTOR JONES: Well, to respond – uh – let's talk about the boundary drops. Basically when
25 you get these large fires going, the mutual-aid system is without boundaries, aside from the state
26 boundaries, because of the way we work workers' compensation and all the systems are set up, is that the
27 reporting by region of available strike teams – in other words, that's the people that can be pulled out of
28 that region but still leave a corps response capability, are reported up through that regional commander. So

1 in our office, when we start dispatching strike teams, we start pulling on those resources and moving them
2 in. So quite frankly you wouldn't want to pull your people off a fire, you wanted the people out of that
3 system to be deployed because it's much quicker. Your people would have to go back through
4 demobilization, pick up their lines, and we'd have to replace them with somebody else, so –

5 **(UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER):** That was understood. That was understood. The
6 question was, knowing that those were gone, and knowing that in the first 12 hours this is incredible spread
7 of the fire and speed and taking out 300 homes within the first 12 hours. Knowing that, who makes the
8 calls beyond. Does it go immediately to the state, or do the calls have to be made locally? Are they calls?
9 Are they electronic? What method do you use and how fast is it?

10 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Dallas, let me help clarify this, I think.

11 DIRECTOR JONES: Sure.

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: If say, San Diego, uh, the fire stated in San Bernardino, you send out strike
13 teams and you use some of the strike teams in San Diego, then all at once San Diego has a problem, and yet
14 some of their firefighting personnel are up in San Bernardino, using other strike teams into the San Diego
15 area, and some of them come from as far as north as Redding. And not necessarily that they would all
16 come from Redding, they come from Orange County, they went really deep into there, they didn't have any
17 fires **(UNINTELLIBLE)**. They went very, very deep into their resources, so did L.A. County, even
18 though they had a lot of fires going, they manned off duty personnel onto excess resources. But the request
19 comes through the incident commander. The fire incident commander puts in a request by type of engine.
20 May want type 3's, may want Type 1's. And so those go into the system, and they're filled by the closest
21 available resource within California.

22 **(UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER):** So you have an electronic system that can go up on a
23 Board and everybody reads it, is that – and you manage it from California, from Sacramento, from
24 Riverside, from where? And is there only, in the San Diego case, many communities have many different
25 fire districts. So who determines who the incident commander is that takes charge over the whole fire?

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: The incident commander, as a mentioned before, is the local government
27 fire chief of that locality, of whoever's turf it is. Now, in some areas it may be CDF. Some may be a
28 volunteer department. But he's the incident commander. Now if he chooses, he can relinquish command

1 to a team, or, you know, say I need help, this is really over my capabilities, and bring in additional
2 resources. That's, that's, you know, easily done.

3 DIRECTOR JONES: But then her question was, then it goes to the region. The method – I think
4 she was asking, where the, how the communication gets to Sacramento. To whom –

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: It goes to the region first. If they can't fill it, then it goes to Sacramento.

6 DIRECTOR JONES: Okay, and you fill from Sacramento.

7 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, we fill from Sacramento. On whatever region has the resource
8 available.

9 DIRECTOR JONES: But you also go out of state for, you get out of state. But that's also with the
10 help of the feds, right?

11 **(UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER):** And of course the last part of it was, can you go out
12 of state before you have exhausted all in-state, particularly where out of state may be nearer
13 geographically?

14 DIRECTOR JONES: Yes, we can. Uh, it's sometimes problematic with some of the states.
15 Nevada, we have had an ongoing relationship for many years because of the Tahoe Basin. We move
16 equipment back and forth all the time. Arizona we haven't moved as much equipment with them because
17 they haven't really, they've more called on us than them coming over. They don't do strike teams, so the
18 time lag, by the time you call Arizona and are able to access them, it takes them a while to identify the
19 engines that are free that can be dispatched, they don't have a system like ours, in other words, where they
20 have command center and you can dispatch. They have to kind of struggle a little to reach all these
21 various fire entities as to who's available and who can go. Then they have to get equipping. Another issue
22 is the fire shelters and all the things – are they equipped? Some of them are, some of them aren't. So the
23 reason we don't often do that is because of those time lags. But when we get there, absolutely, we'll call
24 on them if they're the closest available resource, we'll go to them.

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: But I think the, uh, we interact on a daily basis almost with Nevada. And
26 we have wonderful cooperation from Nevada, and they from us. I think one of the things this points out is
27 how well organized the state of California's mutual-aid system is. I don't think there's anything like it in
28

1 any other state in the nation, although some I think kind of look at it. But that, with FIRESCOPE and the
2 other programs, I think we're far ahead in our firefighting capabilities than any other state in the nation.

3 DIRECTOR JONES: Well, I think, Chairman, it's really a testament to panels such as this that
4 we're able to identify improvements could be made in systems that we ended up where we're at today.
5 You know, it was after many, many fires and identifying areas we can do better and moving forward on it.
6 And that's really what brought California to where they are. Any other questions by commission
7 members? If not, uh, DIRECTOR JONES, thank you very much, we appreciate you being here.

8 DIRECTOR JONES: Thank you.

9 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay, we'll now go to Deputy Director Jim Wright of the California
10 Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. We'll take a short break around 3:00, or after Jim's testimony.
11 No, no, you don't have to limit – you can go to 3:02 or 3:03. [Laughter.]

12 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, distinguished
13 members of the Blue Ribbon Fire Commission. It's a pleasure to be here and have the opportunity to
14 testify before you again at your second meeting. I have the opportunity this afternoon to give you an
15 overview of CDF, the organization, the resources that we command and deploy throughout the state of
16 California, and other resources we have access to through agreements and contractual arrangements.

17 CDF's mission -- the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection protects the people of California
18 from fires, responds to emergencies, and protects and enhances forest, range and watershed values
19 providing social economic and environmental benefits to rural and urban citizens. CDF protects 31 million
20 acres of state responsibility land, which is in essence one-third of all the land in California. CDF has
21 various contractual fire protection services in 35 of the 58 counties. Initial attack philosophy of our
22 organization, the fire protection objective, the CDF fire protection objective states that a system of basic
23 fire protection be provided so that damage to life, property and natural resources will be held at or below a
24 level acceptable within social, political and economic constraints. The Board of Forestry and Fire
25 Protection designates in the fire plan that CDF will strive to contain 95% of all unwanted fires to 10 acres
26 or less. CDF utilizes the closest resource concept regardless of agency and boundaries. CDF resources are
27 made available in staff based upon the approved governor's budgeted allocation to CDF. This has typically
28 been arranged through historical information regarding fire activity periods, basically our fire seasons, as

1 we've traditionally known them, and can range from five to eight months. when our peak staffing levels,
2 peak resources are available. Giving an example, throughout the state of California we have 21
3 administrative units, and they vary in funding from five months to eight months. Our three southern
4 California units – San Bernardino, Riverside, San Diego – are funded on an eight-month fire season period.

5 CDF's resources – we're organized under a headquarters and two regions. Again, we have 21
6 administrative units throughout California, which could be a geographic area of a county, or it could be
7 multiple counties, depending upon the state responsibility lands that's being protected in that geographic
8 area. We operate 229 state funded fire stations, and we also operate 405 local government fire stations
9 under contractual agreements. CDF operates 370 state-owned fire engines, which are specifically designed
10 for the urban wild land interface suppression activities that we do, as Director Jones had mentioned, and the
11 typing of resources is typically a Type 3, or wild land fire engine. They're the first line of defense in
12 California's wild fire suppression. They're a quick, aggressive, initial attack on fires. We employ 3800
13 fulltime fire professionals, foresters and support personnel throughout the department, and we augment this
14 with 1400 seasonal employees during our fire season periods. Under varying contracts, CDF operates 689
15 local government fire engines. And these are a mixture of all the type fire engines that you've seen before
16 you, and we also train and supervise 5600 local government volunteer firefighters throughout the state.

17 Fire crews – CDF, in conjunction with the California Department of Corrections and California
18 Youth Authorities, operate 40 conservation camps in which there are 194 fire crews strategically located
19 throughout the state, employing 4300 firefighting inmates or wards. These fire crews, under the direct
20 supervision and custody of a CDF fire captain, are there to provide fire line construction, assist engine
21 resource crews, mop and rehabilitation work, and service support roles such as feeding and other incident
22 base operations. These fire crews also provide a large labor force to help in flood fight operations during
23 winter periods. They're also a valuable resource in pre-fire and conservation work, doing work such as
24 constructing fire fuel breaks, reducing flammable fuels from areas at risk, resource management
25 enhancement for state and federal agencies, and also local agencies, and provide hazard reduction of fuel
26 modifications.

27 CDF's aerial firefighting resources – the tactical application of firefighting aircraft is to slow the
28 spread of fire, or work on a specific spot until the arrival of ground resources. We operate 13 tactical

1 aircraft, but these aircraft are the responsibility of creating all of the aerial resources on an incident.
2 They're also used for mapping, reconnaissance, lightning detection, and also aerial photography.

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: These don't drop the retardant or water?

4 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: No, sir. This is a tactical platform. Those familiar with aircraft
5 – and I believe we had a slide on the aircraft, it's a military converted OV10 Bronco, which has been a
6 great asset to us – provides an excellent platform for overseeing aerial firefighting operations.

7 CDF operates 23 air tankers, 7 of which have a capacity of 800 gallons of retardant, and these are
8 considered, or classified as an S2A model aircraft. These are old military sub-tracker aircraft, which were
9 aircraft base operated. And through a CDF aircraft modernization program, we're two-thirds of the way
10 through a complete conversion of our air tanker fleet, which we're current operation 16 S2T, or turban-
11 powered, aircraft that has the capability of 1200 gallons of retardant.

12 In our aerial fleet, we also operate 11 super Huey helicopters, 9 of which are first-line helicopters
13 strategically deployed throughout the state of California, which carry a fly crew consisting of a captain and
14 up to 8 firefighters that are carried in the helicopter and dropped off for line construction while the
15 helicopter goes off and does water dropping operations in support of that ground crew.

16 CDF also has available, through contracts, 7 additional helicopters with other county or local fire
17 agencies throughout the state. We also have 11 helicopters available to us through contractual agreements
18 with local county law enforcement agencies. Other CDF firefighting resources include 60 bulldozers, 5
19 mobile communication units, 11 mobile kitchen units, and we also deploy 10 organized incident command
20 teams that are used in managing large incidents, and also can manage other non-fire incident situations.

21 CDF also has an additional state-funded firefighting resources available through contractual
22 agreements with the counties of Orange, Los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, Kern and Marin, most
23 commonly referred to by us as our contract counties. Throughout those counties we have available for state
24 responsibility protection 82 fire engines and 12 bulldozer units.

25 Federal resources that are available to CDF – all California federal wild land fire resources are
26 available through an established cooperative agreements with our federal wildfire partners. Additional
27 federal firefighting resources, if needed, outside the state are requested through our federal partners to the
28 National Interagency Coordination Center located in Boise, Idaho. Local firefighting resources are also

1 available through the OES mutual-aid system, or also throughout local CDF unit agreements. And CDF
2 has other state agency resources available. It depends through various agreements exist with other state
3 agencies for specific resources, and that could be with Cal Trans, for an example, as a resource available to
4 us, and other entities within the state government.

5 We also have the ability to access non-agency resources. In the world of contract resources, each
6 CDF emergency command center maintains an emergency resource directory that lists all local vendors and
7 contractors who provide either firefighting resources or fire support resource-type of equipment and
8 personnel. CDF negotiates equipment rental rates with these vendors prior to our fire season periods to
9 have them ready when called upon, and these agreements range with these vendors covering hundreds of
10 bulldozers throughout the state of California, water tenders, and other type support equipment. In
11 conjunction with the forest service, we have established standardized rates for this equipment because we
12 use them on cross-jurisdictions. The forest service also has access to these private vendors within
13 California. Also included in non-agency are aircraft assets. Call when needed, or referred to by us as
14 CWN helicopters, these are privately owned helicopters through vendors that have been certified to conduct
15 firefighting operations within our theater of operations. They're properly equipped for that, they have
16 communications with us, and they're trained in actual firefighting operations, so it's a safe, seamless
17 operation and they can blend in, in the aerial theater of operation. These helicopters are also shared by
18 other agencies and they're also used nationally and internationally. Based upon the availability of
19 contractors during a given time, there are approximately 45 heli-tankers, or the sky crane as you may know
20 them as, helicopters available, and 150 helicopters as well.

21 I'd like now to shift in, give an explanation, and the question came up about when resources are
22 ordered and what that process is. I'd like to walk you through what happens when a fire is reported to a
23 CDF emergency command center, either via a 911 call or a report by a lookout of a wild land fire. Once
24 the information is given to a command center, the incident is worked up through our computer-aided
25 dispatch, which based on the location, identifies the closest available resources to the location of the
26 incident, and with that indicates to a dispatcher what resources (**UNINTELLIGIBLE**) responded to the
27 fire. A typical wild land response, CDF response to a wild fire is, a chief officer, 5 fire engines, 2 fire
28 crews, an air tactical aircraft, two air tankers and a helicopter. Once this dispatch process has started, the

1 incident dispatcher enters the information, the fire information and aircraft crew resources, into a system,
2 an automated system, that we refer to as the Multi-Agency Incident Resource Processing System, or
3 MIRPS. The system is a computer-automated program which helps the dispatcher track, provides a timely
4 accurate accountability of where the resources are gathered from, and where they're being located on the
5 incident. Each resource, give it a fire engine, a strike team, an overhead personnel, is identified by a
6 request number, and that's the starting point of when resources are ordered for an incident, it'll have an
7 incident number and request number based upon that. And that's how a lot of this is tracked by those
8 request numbers. As you can imagine, the dispatch is started, the stations are alerted, the aircraft are
9 launched, people are on their way to the fire. There's additional calls coming in, new information
10 regarding a better location of the fire, the dispatchers are taking this information. Based on information
11 still being gathered, the dispatcher in essence is the identified incident commander and based on
12 information they are receiving from phone calls and other intelligence -- from a lookout, whatever -- they
13 can augment the initial attack dispatch based on information they're receiving. And many times do, while
14 the first initial attack resources are on their way.

15 Once the first company officer arrives at scene, they assume the responsibility of incident
16 commander. That incident commander provides an overview of what the situation is and makes a request
17 for additional information based upon what that incident commander is viewing, his experience and
18 knowledge, and what this particular incident will do. This report on condition is given to the dispatch
19 center, additional resources if needed are made, and that incident commander makes the appropriate
20 assignments of the incoming resources to that fire incident. And an organization on that fire is now
21 established. Once a chief officer arrives, they will typically assume the command of the fire and the
22 incident command, or role. Again the dispatch center is continually taking reports of this fire, or other fires
23 that they're dealing with, and they're also dealing with the resources that are being requested by that
24 incident commander.

25 The CDF dispatch centers have direct access to other local government fire dispatch centers and
26 also our federal partners, and through intercom systems or direct lines, we have access that we can do
27 prompt request for resources and backed up through the MIRP system. If a fire protection resource is
28 needed and not available locally, the incident dispatcher will then place the request in the CDF MIRP

1 system to our region operation center. CDF operates two regional operation centers, one in Riverside and
2 one in Redding, which are co-located with the two geographic coordination centers of the United States
3 Forest Service in the same facility. The regions, once orders are starting to come to the region from the
4 local unit, begin moving resources from the next closest areas to the incident to cover behind resources
5 responding to the fire, and also to respond additional resources to the incident. The region operational
6 centers are responsible for, in conjunction with, Sacramento Command and Control for the balancing of
7 resources throughout the state. As I mentioned to you in the last meeting, it's a large state that we have,
8 we've referred to it as, it's like chess board where you're strategically moving resources based upon your
9 incident needs. And this system, through the region operations and Sacramento Command and Control, we
10 have to make sure we have balanced resources, moving resources where they're needed based upon fire
11 activities, to maintain a balanced level of a standing forest fire protection throughout the state.

12 The MIRP system is an excellent tool for us to watch for draw-downs, as we call, in the overall
13 resource pool throughout the state for CDF resources, and also for federal resources. We watch that, we
14 make decisions based upon that, as to where those next areas that we may have to move out into, either
15 being an adjacent state or going through the federal system to reach outside of the forest service Region 5
16 area in California.

17 If local fire protection resources are requested, the incident dispatcher places that order with the
18 OES operational area command center. As Director Jones mentioned, in some cases the CDF emergency
19 command center is that location, because we wear dual hats throughout the state in conjunction with our
20 partners at OES. And through this system, the local government resources are accessed through those
21 operational areas. If the operational area, as mentioned before, cannot fill that resource, they then go to the
22 next level in Sacramento for the Sacramento system to start moving resources into the incident areas for fill
23 in, or direct to the fire incident.

24 All fires in California are managed under an incident command system, or ICS. The incident
25 command assigns resources as they arrive to an incident. Now, fire resources just don't show up at a fire
26 and start doing whatever they want to, this is an organized fashion and the incident commander develops a
27 strategic tactical plan to deploy in the suppression of the fire and as resources come to him based upon their
28

1 typing or their capabilities, they are deployed to certain areas under that organization in an end zone, such
2 as divisions, or groups, or what have you, that have a specific role in the suppression of the fire.

3 As an incident organization grows with the size of the fire, more levels of that organization grow,
4 and there are levels of support that need to go along with that. You just can't have all fire suppression
5 resources out there doing that – they need a level of support along with that, for feeding, logistical, other
6 logistical needs, and what have you. So under the ICS system, they have the capability of expanding and
7 also contracting, as an incident slowly diminishes to a controlled state.

8 As we discussed earlier, military resource assets – CDF does not have direct access to military
9 resources. They do not have that capability. We do operate under the fact that until all contracted
10 firefighting resources are depleted, we in California can, through an agreement which has been in place a
11 number of years and I believe is a model agreement that we operate under, with our California National
12 Guard, is that we can place a request for guard assets to assist in fire suppression activities. And that is
13 done through procedural notification and requesting through the Office of Emergency Service Fire and
14 Rescue Branch.

15 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Can you do that prior to utilizing all of the available contracted aircraft?

16 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: I believe we could do that if we are projecting that, once a call
17 has gone out to solicit all available contract aircraft that may be available, depending upon the type that is
18 actually needed -- and these aircraft are also typed by size and capability – and depending their availability
19 and response time. Now based in an emergency situation, I don't think it would be prudent to wait 12
20 hours or more for a vendor's aircraft to be summoned from a job that they're doing off the fire season
21 period in an Eastern state, or what have you, or an international country, to wait for that asset to come back
22 to California.

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: So you're saying the contract aircraft, many of the contract aircraft, might
24 not even be in the state at the time you request it.

25 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: That's correct. And again, it's dependent upon their availability
26 and their response time capability. It would be prudent that it would be quicker, and I think once we could
27 document that that fact is established, we could go to alert the guard units and make a request based on that
28 in a disaster situation.

1 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Joan Monroe, you're gonna get that. I'm gonna ask Congressman Lewis's
2 question for her. [Laughter.]

3 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Other agreements that CDF has in place – We maintain
4 cooperative agreements with 172 local government agencies and through that we have access to 536
5 engines, over 100 squads, 118 water tenders, you know, various other units from medical units to rescue
6 units, hazardous material units, and communications systems. We also have, again, agreements with six
7 county fire departments which I've referred to as our contract counties, and also we have agreements with
8 federal agencies, such as Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service,
9 United States Forest Service, BLM, and National Park Service. CDF also participates in the California Fire
10 Assistance Agreement, in which California Federal Agency and CDF, with OES, for the use of local
11 government resources when we are tasking local government to come assist in a wild fire situation.

12 We also have 20 cooperative agreements with other state agencies, as I mentioned before. These
13 are specifically Department of Corrections and Department of Youth Authority, with which we joint
14 operations with our conservation camps. And also the California Highway Patrol. We also are a signed
15 participant in the Emergency State Assistance, a local government, a commonly used doctrine called The
16 Seven Points of Light, to when a local entity has exhausted their capability to deal with an emergency, they
17 can call upon state assets to come in to help that local government entity with state resources, until that
18 situation can be abated to where that local government can then assume a reasonable control of that
19 incident without the additional assistance from the state.

20 We also participate in interstate compact agreements with states such as Idaho, Nevada, Oregon,
21 Washington, Utah and Montana. You heard earlier, we have in over the last three years sent multiple
22 firefighting resources to states as far as Montana, Nevada on a routine basis, Arizona, and also into Oregon.

23 Military assets again is that, through an agreement with the California National Guard to provide us
24 assistance with firefighting resources, again we make those requests through OES fire and mutual-aid
25 system. With that we access to two C130 mass air tankers that are available here in California, and also 15
26 other helicopters consisting of 10 other Black Hawks and 5 Chinooks. Now, again, depending upon world
27 conflict situations, as you know, our National Guard units have been tasked in support and of international
28 conflicts, it depends upon their availability as well. And this agreement that we have, I cannot stress again

1 how such a model program this is, and as we talked about utilization of federal military resources, I would
2 hope that this document, or this agreement and procedures that we have in place, could be expanded to be
3 that door opening for other federal military assets. It's a very good program. We train routinely with the
4 Guard units, we've provided them communications, we've provided them with firefighting apparatus such
5 as buckets for water dropping capabilities, and we have this well-oiled machine between the two
6 departments that they are a valuable asset and we have certainly routinely used them annually in our
7 firefighting mission.

8 One of the items that we were asked also to touch on in our overview of how CDF organizations in
9 place, what we have available to us and what have you, and how we operate with other agencies. We
10 talked about resources activating and coordination barriers is that we wanted to talk about, and start into the
11 world of making recommendations and how we can do things better. Some of the things that are facing
12 CDF which have been barriers, but we continue to do the best we can with what resources available we
13 have to us, is that we're undergoing with what we have termed a changing face in our organization. For the
14 past several years, our department has been impacted almost by a one-third of our work force has changed
15 due to retirements. And with that, we have brought on new personnel to take those places in our
16 organization, which lends to experience level differences throughout the organization, and also through
17 budgetary issues and imposed hiring freezes, we have multiple vacancies throughout our department. And
18 some of the things that we saw during this fire siege that we had to overcome was that because we have a
19 classification within our mid-management level of our department, because of varying vacancies and
20 varying reasons for those vacancies, we had to deploy higher level management position, or personnel,
21 down into these fire organizations to perform the roles that traditionally have been filled by personnel at
22 our assistant chief level within our organization. We had a strain placed upon us because of that, and also
23 there was a strain placed on us that CDF executive management and incident command teams were
24 interrupted during our firefighting operations to handle political, public and meaty issues throughout this
25 fire siege. And we'll get to a point where during these high activity, multiple fire situations, that there is a
26 need for information. There is a need for political entities to get involved. But we can do that under a
27 coordinated fashion to where they don't impose problems, they don't interfere with fire suppression
28

1 activities, and we can make improvements there hopefully by better educating everybody involved, from
2 the politicians down to the public, whose facing this monstrous fire bearing down on their community.

3 I'd like to, at this point, talk about, again, some initial thoughts about recommendations, how we do
4 things better in the future, or what we would hope that we're looking at, for this commission to go forward
5 with their final report. Some suggested or some idea recommendations is that we would hope that we could
6 have some consideration for proper funding of your statewide wildfire organization, California Department
7 of Forestry and Fire Protection. As I mentioned to you, the struggle that we face here in southern
8 California, we have seen it over the past three years with an extended drought period, we're trying to
9 operate a fire protection system year-round on an eight-month checkbook. That's very difficult to do. You
10 certainly stretch your resources, to try to stretch your dollars as best you can, and we're very fortunate that
11 again that we have, that we've heard many say and I tout all the time, the best fire protection system
12 anywhere, that we have the available and opportunity to reach out to our local and federal cooperators to
13 help us through these periods when our funding is at its lowest peak and that we are not able to fund and
14 deploy the majority of our firefighting assets that we had the opportunity to throughout the season period in
15 which we're budgeted for. California's undergoing a climatic change, and we have to recognize that, and
16 we have to analyze and support this and go forth with proper funding for us to deal with today's California
17 fire environment. Again, funding this at the proper level and periods of fire seasons. Also, proper funding
18 of, our CDF fire engines are staffed at three persons. These fire engines are designed to be maximum
19 effective with four to five personnel. We're running at a somewhat inefficient level. Through executive
20 orders during the last three years and one year in northern California because of fire conditions, the
21 administration has authorized CDF to staff its fire engines at four persons. And we have documented that
22 that increased level of staffing on our CDF fire engines make those engines more effective in their
23 suppression capabilities as they are with **3/0 staffing**. And we have documented this through the successes
24 that when these resources respond to fires, this fourth person almost adds a 25% increase into the capability
25 of that fire fighting resource. And if you can imagine, if they're regularly staffed with three, and you staff
26 them with four, once you get up to the third engine, you've reduced the need for a fourth engine in most
27 cases. So we're looking at maximum efficiency in what we have. Now I would certainly love to have
28 more fire engines, and over the last 20 years we figured we have lost through budget reductions anywhere

1 from 25 to 30 fire engine companies throughout the CDF system. Now I doubt very seriously we'll get
2 those back. But, if we can maintain our current budgeted level of engines and make them more efficient,
3 our fire suppression capability will be better.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Are you saying that in some cases you roll engines merely for the
5 additional personnel at a fire?

6 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: That's correct.

7 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay.

8 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Communications is another area that we continually look upon
9 and have come out in other

10 **[SOME TAPE LEFT, BUT NOTHING ON IT.]**

11 **[BEGINNING TAPE 2, SIDE A]**

12 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: . . . we had the communications needed in these fire
13 suppression activities. We need to further enhance and keep the coordination and the working relationship
14 solid with our local and federal firefighting partners. Hired equipment that we utilize – I call this a reserve
15 force to us. Since were not funded to have this type of resource on our payrolls all the time, it becomes a
16 hired reserve force to us. We can look in there and do things better with that. There are, I'll say
17 bureaucratic issues associated with these through contracting arrangements that we struggle through. Just
18 this past year we have struggled dearly with issues of small businesses and disabled veterans, businesses
19 associated with hired equipment to where it has been a struggle for us to make sure that we're making
20 quotas for certain hires of resources like that, which may not necessarily be the closest resource, but we
21 have had these mandates placed upon our department that we think we can do better and be as fair as we
22 can at the spread of the business. It's unfortunate that we've had to rely on hired businesses and in some
23 cases we don't have enough fires to hire everybody that's on the list, and sometimes that becomes a
24 demand that's placed upon us is that everyone wants a piece of the fires.

25 Our aerial firefighting resources – we have, I'll say the best aerial firefighting program anywhere.
26 Through a recent Blue Ribbon Commission that was initiated by the federal government, they came to
27 California, looked at our program and as Director Jones mentioned, a recommendation is that it would be
28 nice if our federal firefighting cooperators had the ability to establish a program similar to California's.

1 California has truly benefited from CDF's ability to acquire used military aircraft through the federal
2 excess property program to basically rebuild and turn that into new working aircraft and have saved the
3 state, I'm sure, billions of dollars over the many years we have been utilizing this program with air assets.
4 One thing that we're facing is that these federal excess property aircraft are starting to dry up. We're
5 utilizing 1960 vintage Huey helicopters, some of which flew in Vietnam. And those airframes are slowly
6 drying up. And with the differences in type changes that the military has used in both fixed wing and also
7 helicopter-type resources, the availability for us to reach in to grab "X" military resources I believe is
8 drying up. And we're going to be faced with, at a point in time, that we will have to start buying new
9 aircraft to replace the federal excess program assets we have acquired and used through the many years
10 we've been in our program. This will be a costly venture, but we need to start planning for it now. Our
11 helicopters we need to initiate quickly. Looking at a short range, 5 and 10 year plan, to start replacing
12 these. I mentioned we're two-thirds of the way through an air tanker modernization. Those S2T's, turban
13 powered fixed wing aircraft, should push us out a good 20-years life of those aircraft. Our helicopters are a
14 different story. We will start having to replace those helicopters soon and the only thing I see is that we
15 will have to start purchasing aircraft from helicopter manufacturers because we will not have the available
16 to military aircraft as we have had in the past.

17 We also need to look at how we increase CDF capabilities, especially in our helicopter program.
18 The trend is going for more capacity in helicopter drops. Our helicopters typically fly, if it's a fixed tank or
19 a bucket that you see dangling below a helicopter, in the range of anywhere from 200 to 350 gallons of
20 water. The trend is to use a heavier helicopter capable of carrying more water, up to 800 or a 1000 gallons
21 of water for good pinpoint accuracy and deployment of air suppression resources, and I certainly encourage
22 that we look that way.

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Is that the Chinook?

24 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Be the Chinook or a version of the Black Hawk helicopter
25 referred to as a Fire Hawk that has been converted to fire application.

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Can the Black Hawk carry as many gallons as the Chinook?

27 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: No, sir.

28 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay.

1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: There's a, again, as we continue through the commission we
2 will come up with more of these, but I wanted to share these preliminary suggestions. And again, they're
3 kind of focused toward CDF specific, but if we look at the overall picture that you're all charged with,
4 again we will see things that I'm sure will come out from your commission dealing in building standards,
5 dealing in fuel modifications, and other areas, not only firefighting hardware, but codes and ordinances and
6 land use planning issues, which I feel are all combined and to deal with California wild fire situation.

7 Mr. Chair, at that, that will conclude my presentation, and I stand ready for any questions from the
8 commissioners.

9 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much. Were there any questions? Yes.

10 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** When you were talking about the conservation camps,
11 are those what are also called honor camps, or is that something different?

12 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: In our system, they are something different. These are
13 conservation camps. They are utilizing state inmates or state wards. Honor camps are typically located in
14 county operations and typically deployed county detainees.

15 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Okay, so that would be a local jurisdiction.

16 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Local jurisdiction, yes, sir.

17 CHAIR CAMPBELL: A misdemeanor versus a felony.

18 **(UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER):** I have a comment --

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Excuse me, we had one question down here first.

20 **(UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER):** Okay.

21 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Actually I have two questions for the chief. Uh, Jim,
22 could you briefly explain the **PRESSLER** bill and whether or not you might recommend changes to that?
23 And second question is, has to do with the access of contract or National Guard resources and the reaction
24 time to have them in the air or on the ground in response, and would they be considered initial attack
25 resources in your deployment plants?

26 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Okay, thank you. The **PRESSLER** bill, as **(UNINTELLIBLE**
27 **Chip Prather?)** referred to is a federal bill that basically dictates the use of public aircraft. In essence, a --
28 in our case would be a CDF aircraft that we've acquired through the public system federal excess property.

1 In that, that restricts the operation of that helicopter to mission essential operations, meaning that if it's
2 deployed for fire suppression activities, then that needs to be 90% or more of that helicopter's operation, or
3 the fixed wing aircraft operations. In essence, the **PRESSLER** bill, and if anyone has any additional
4 specific questions regarding this, I have two of our aviation staff here with me today that can get more
5 detail into that, but in essence the **PRESSLER** bill basically charges the pilot of that aircraft, and could
6 jeopardize their license in utilizing that aircraft for non-mission essential uses. To give you an example, I
7 could not order a CDF helicopter here today and take any of you commissioners on a joy ride or a flight
8 around the city of San Bernardino just to take a look at how the city is laid out. That's not a mission that
9 CDF would do. However –

10 CHAIR CAMPBELL: You could take us on a mission to observe the fire area.

11 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: That's correct. Under a mission to an incident to take you up, a
12 political entity, to take you up to look at how a fire may be encroaching or threatening your local
13 jurisdiction, we certainly could utilize that aircraft for that. But it cannot be used for anything other than
14 the mission that the aircraft is deployed for. The second question brought up by the chief regarding the
15 guard units and the activation – they unfortunately do not stand ready for initial attack. Through our
16 ordering system, again, we're utilizing all of our standing resources first; we're going out to our contract
17 availability aircraft in doing that. Once we get to that point where we're going to get into and activate our
18 guard units, we give them an alert through the OES system, saying that we're getting to the point, we're
19 soliciting how many aircraft you have available to us, how many are in service, and what type of response
20 time can we consider. So that helps us with our planning for resource deployment to know what their
21 availability and their hour of deployment is. Once the request goes to the guard, depending upon their
22 aircraft availability, the location of their aircraft and their flight crews, it could – depending upon those
23 factors, could be 12 hours or 24 hours, depending upon their availability and readiness of their crews to
24 deploy. Now, again, and there's a preparation time that goes into the fact is that as you know, through our
25 program, we properly identify for safety purposes some of the prep work that the guard goes through is
26 highlighting or numbering their aircraft with high visibility paint, because as you know, that OD green
27 paint that's typically on military resources, you cannot see that real well in smoke conditions or flying over
28 vegetation terrain. I mean, that's why they're painted there for normal missions. So in preparation work

1 that they do, they use high visibility paint to paint their numbers, their identification numbers on, and
2 identification markings so that that aircraft can be seen by our air tactical aircraft on our incidents. So
3 there's a lot of work that goes on once the guard is alerted and ordered to assist CDF and fire control
4 operations, so depending on some of those factors depends on how fast they can deploy.

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you, Chief. Mayor?

6 MAYOR VALLES: Uh, yes, a comment, and then there's some questions. First of all this has
7 been very information to understand the functions of all the different firefighting agencies and departments
8 within the state of California. Some statements that you made begged some questions, and one of them has
9 already been asked at the last meeting and also by the representative from San Diego. It has to do with
10 communications. One of the recommendations that was made earlier by Director Jones was the upgrading
11 the -- what was it? -- The OES and Oasis system, and also integrate the MIRP system. And then you
12 mentioned something about the, we're talking about interoperability and you talked about the 800 system
13 that people tout is just absolutely the max, but it doesn't really work. My question would be, what would
14 be the optimum interoperability system statewide? You don't have to answer right now, but you think
15 about that. Okay? Cause I don't know if there is such a thing that would respond to the question asked by
16 the representative from San Diego. Of course ideally we watch TV and we think okay, there's a big screen
17 up there and all we to do is punch a button and we know what's happening statewide. I don't know, if
18 that's possible, think about that question.

19 My next question, and that was based on something you said, you have a checkbook for eight
20 months. I suspect the eight months is because that is in line with what is considered the hazardous period
21 in California with respect to fires. And then, the question is what kind of staffing do you have to fight
22 those fires if it is only for eight months and then what are they doing the rest of the year, and then what
23 type of training do they have, or is needed, in light of the fact that you are using some California Youth
24 Conservation, and I suspect they're not used for firefighting, so I want an explanation of what they're used
25 for. And then the third question would be, a clear cut -- I guess I'm looking for a master plan, and I don't
26 know if there is such an animal either -- real clear definitions of the functions of all the firefighting agencies
27 within the state of California. I know we have mutual-aid, and I know we work closely with each other,
28 and I've probably given you more than you need, but you also said something else, about the politics,

1 getting involved with your being able to do your job efficiently, that's how I understood it. I wanted you to
2 be more specific about that because I think that's a truth that needs to be articulated so that that should also
3 be part of the commission. Politics does get involved. Unfortunately it shouldn't play a role when we're
4 fighting fires and trying to save people. It needs to stay out of it, but it needs to be said. So did I give you
5 too much?

6 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: I tried to remember as much of that as I could, and Mayor, if I
7 could start back with your last question.

8 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Let me make one observation. The correctional and Youth Authority
9 people are not utilized for escape and evasion. [Laughter]

10 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: We try to keep them in our custody when we're out with them.
11 (Laughs) If I may start answering the Mayor's questions, and again I tried to remember as many of those
12 as I can. I'd like to start with your last comment first. The interaction from the political side of this, you
13 know, I stated at the last commission meeting that we just experienced a history-altering event. You know,
14 in my nearly 30-year career I have not seen anything to this magnitude. We've been close, in 10-year
15 cycling fire sieges when we've had them, but this one certainly did put a strain on the entire system. The
16 system didn't fail. It didn't fail. It was strained, it was pushed to its max. But what we encountered, and
17 after working in local government settings for a number of years and understanding local government from
18 the city and county level and how it blends in with the state, I truly understand the need of the local
19 politicians and the state politicians and the federal politicians as needing to have a role. Because I realize
20 and know that your constituents are calling you in a time of panic, in a dire strait situation, and wanting
21 you, their elected official, to do something. And in a lot of cases where, you know, throughout times when
22 we've had normal fire situations where it hasn't necessarily needed interactions from the local politicians,
23 things go fine. But during these sieges, when everybody is just maxed to their – your city, your county,
24 EOC operations are going, and your city, county staffs are engaged in their disaster preparedness situations,
25 how they're dealing with this emergency from the local perspective, and getting your EOC's up and
26 operating. There's a role there for political officials. And sometimes we may not have a true defined role.
27 And in those times where you haven't been needed to interact, we didn't take those opportunities, probably,
28 to train you or to educate you in what exactly goes on during these times. You're truly trying to serve your

1 constituents. They've elected you, they're call upon you to do something, and if you do not have a good
2 handle on what is really going on in this disaster situation, who is responsible for what, and what of those
3 activities are going on, those coordinating activities are going on locally, regionally, statewide, then you're
4 going into that theater unknown and you will kind of tend to migrate toward things and start picking at
5 those, what went wrong? And I hate to say this, but I'll use the term. Monday morning quarterbacking
6 started on Saturday. It didn't wait until Monday. We got fully engaged in answering calls from legislators
7 – local, state, federal – and you know, I was subject to that, and I have a role as Chief of Fire Protection for
8 CDF to manage the overall operations, and when I have to take time out to do that educational thing, to
9 answer questions that we wish could have taken care of before hand, that took time away, valuable time
10 away, from me and other fire managers throughout the state that were dealing with this disastrous situation,
11 it took value time away from us. It held us from coordination meetings, it held us from getting out there
12 with our resources to make sure we were aware first hand what was going on, making sure that the
13 coordination of local/state is happening out there. And I don't mean to say that the local officials are
14 problems, but in this case they did create some problems. I don't it was meant, I think it was just out of a
15 need to do something, because that's your responsibility. That's what you took office to do. And because
16 of either staffing shortages that we were dealing with – I know there was an issue in San Diego county
17 about a CDF representative being late to the county (**UNINTELLIGIBLE**) operation. You know, that
18 unit, that CDF unit was taxed, we had everyone engaged in fires in San Diego County, so it may have been
19 a delay in getting a CDF rep to that EOC. But we eventually got there. So, one of the things that we've
20 talked about and looked at, and you know, had time to sit back and think, gosh, what could we have done
21 better. And I think what we would like to propose, and I think after learning this -- and we learn things
22 after each situation like this – if we could have had a dedicated person to deal with elected officials in
23 giving them that point of contact to ask those questions, raise those concerns with and stuff, I feel we may
24 have been able to serve you better. And maybe a recommendation that comes out of this commission is
25 that we do a better job at educating our political offices in disaster response and recovery operation so that
26 you have a knowledge of that, you have to, because of SEMS and your government operations, you have to
27 have that basic knowledge. But if you don't practice it for a number of years, and newly elected officials

28

1 come along and change that system, and it's not exercised, there's a weakness there. And that could lead to
2 these situations where interference or inefficiencies start getting involved.

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Chief, let me add this. I think in this day and age there's a great demand
4 for information, and I think one of the areas that we need to look into is that there is getting good
5 information to people quickly. I think we need to talk about the establishment on a major fire of a
6 statewide web page that is constantly updated in reflecting maybe even the mapping that we have and
7 where the fires are, and how quickly they're going – there were some web sites that were set up by
8 individuals, but I think the state also has a responsibility to come up with the official one that, uh, as
9 information comes in, it's given to that web site. And the other thing is, we do a reasonably good job of
10 informing the media, and then we expect the media to then inform the general population. But I think we
11 can also take a look at increasing the amount of information and the data that they get in the media as
12 quickly as possible, and also with the web site, so that people look over hill. And when you have a Santa
13 Ana wind condition, you know, it may be a couple of miles away and then a few minutes later it's in your
14 back yard. And I think that happened in certain cases, particularly in this area, and I think information
15 going out, not just to elected officials, but to the public in general, is one of the things we have to establish
16 and we have to look at very seriously.

17 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: You're absolutely correct. And we strive very hard to be as
18 timely with our information and what have you, and I did hear several situations where they felt that
19 information was not timely and stuff. One of the things that we in the fire service, or any emergency
20 services entity faces is that the, we're battling the capabilities of the news media. They're there with their
21 helicopters, they're providing first hand information and stuff, and I'll be honest with you, sometimes that's
22 a lot of good intelligence for us. That we're watching and monitoring that as well. So as far as timely
23 information, we try to – and what's important to us is being as accurate as we can, especially when we have
24 deaths involved cause there was information we were holding back at one point. One, the fire service
25 doesn't determine deaths and notifications of that. We have to maintain and wait until the sheriff or corner
26 operations take care of that before we start spouting off, yeah, there's been 12 fatalities. We want to be
27 very careful of what information we do put out because we want it to be accurate and factual. That is, and
28 we had several web sites established by private entities or private local groups that were watching first hand

1 information and doing that. So, we'll always probably have a varying degree of information outlets
2 through there. But, we do, once an incident command team is assigned to an incident, CDF does post a
3 web site for the particular incidents that's updated based on information that's given through the system
4 that we can keep people informed through the web site, which is a valuable tool to us nowadays, in getting
5 that information out. So, but, that can be expanded, and we do better. But, there again, to do better, to
6 expand things, takes money to do that. And in our fiscal climate we're in, you know, where are we? But it
7 makes a great recommendation to do that.

8 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you. Uh, there's a question – yes, sir.

9 MAYOR VALLES: That was just one of them. You (UNINTELLIGIBLE) –

10 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: That was one of them. I still have some more, I remember.

11 MAYOR VALLES: Yes, the communication, the optimum –

12 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: You asked me for the optimum communication. The optimum
13 communication would be, I could talk on my CDF radio to an entity that's on an 800 system with no
14 problem. That's the optimum radio system.

15 MAYOR VALLES: You can't do that now?

16 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: We can do that. There is technology out there now that allows
17 us – and we call them or refer to them as black boxes, where you can take one radio from one entity and
18 one from yours, put them in a box, hook some wires together and talk and they'll come out on the other
19 system. We've utilized that for years. Obviously there's differences, there's changes in the radio
20 communication world coming out, technology is leading us to digital communications equipment. Also
21 because of demands on frequencies, the system of, or narrow banding, is coming to us, where our common
22 frequencies we're using now are being compressed, or squeezed, to get the double frequencies out of what
23 frequency bands that are available out there. So, we have those challenges ahead of us too. But the
24 concept of a VHF, or very high frequency, band versus a UHF, ultra high, or an 800 system, trunking
25 system, all these technical things that have come along, and each one is touted the best, there has to be a
26 system in place or technology in place to tie all these together and do that. The answer is not truly a
27 statewide 800 system. My personal experience with 800 systems, they have to grow and grow and grow to
28 make them somewhat effective, and a lot of money has been put into 800 systems, and as we've seen in

1 several situations. We just found recently, for an example, 800 megahertz radios do not work inside fire
2 shelters.

3 MAYOR VALLES: Wow.

4 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: There's a barrier there. We just found that out through testing
5 with our federal cooperators that there is an issue there with that frequency band, and it could pose a safety
6 issue on that. So, to answer your question, the ultimate system would be a system that we could talk to on
7 the systems that we currently have in place through technology that allows them to talk together.

8 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That's why at one of the hearings, Mayor, will be an in depth look at
9 communications. The black boxes, and there is a much, much more expensive way of redoing the whole
10 system, and we can't afford to do that.

11 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: That's correct.

12 MAYOR VALLES: Thanks. The third one was training, um, something to do with training.

13 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: You were asking, one of your other questions was basically our,
14 I call our, eight month fire protection checkbook here in southern California. You asked about that, and
15 yes, that is based on historical fire activity history that we have chartered, and to – maybe at one of the
16 other meetings I can bring you a chart as how we track this, and how are budget is based on. You can
17 imagine a 12-month chart, and we have historically tracked fire activity in each of our units, and we'll just
18 say San Bernardino, for an example here, our unit in San Bernardino budgeted fire season is April 15
19 through December 15. That's our base budgeted period when we have active and standing fire suppression
20 forces on hand. To look at that on a 12-month, over a 10-year period, it truly shows that the fire activity
21 that has occurred in a 10-year average in the San Bernardino unit goes in the early spring when we have our
22 springtime fire season when your grass fuels are starting to dry, you get into that, they start up in activity
23 and you get this bell affect on this chart when you hit July, August and September, the peak fire season
24 periods here in southern California. That's when the fuels are at their utmost situation to where they can
25 burn, and burn fiercely, and then they start tapering off back into the October, November and then finally
26 December. So this is what we have used historically are those tracking of the historic fire activity periods
27 to establish these months. Now we know for the last three years because of prolonged drought, we've had
28 fires in January, February, especially in San Diego County we experienced that. And as we look at

1 California's changing climatic situation, we're going to a year-round fire season. We see changes in our
2 northern California units as well. Instead of being on a four- or five-month period, they're actually having
3 activity showing up now historically, because of these climatic changes, and changes in fuels, that they're
4 stretching now into six and seven months. What we're saying, we need to go back and again, look at that,
5 and you know, analyze that and project that out and provide the funding to make sure that CDF has those
6 wild land firefighting resources available. Now, those four months traditionally are non-fire season, as we
7 used to call it, from mid-December through April 15. That's typically when we have known it here in
8 southern California to be our winter period. We had rains and snow in the mountain areas and things where
9 the fuels were not of condition to readily burn. That has changed, and we're doing that. How CDF has
10 been dealing with that in the last several years is one, when we utilize our predictive services, and that's
11 where we utilize weather information and activity levels, we take all that into consideration, and we project
12 out. We have had Santa Ana wind conditions in January and February in southern California. When we
13 can predict these, and project when that can be, CDF does have the ability to expand back our forces. We
14 can make call back, we put personnel on overtime, we have the ability to hire back firefighters as
15 emergency workers to staff those engines back up, and we utilize those recalled forces for the period of the
16 threat that it goes. It might be a two-week period, it could be a whole month, it could go through the four
17 months that we have experienced in San Diego county, and in Riverside county as well, where we have just
18 basically kept those wild land engines on, and we have the ability to do that staffing through our emergency
19 fund capability CDF has established with the Department of Finance, to deal with extraordinary conditions
20 outside out normally budgeted periods of staffing.

21 MAYOR VALLES: Okay. I had another question on training, but I'll ask you after, I don't want
22 to hog the time.

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you, Mayor.

24 MAYOR VALLES: I was concerned about standardized training for all firefighters in the state of
25 California, cause I think there's different standards. I'm not sure. That's just a sense that I have. For
26 example, for firefighters within the city, I know they have to go through a fire academy under certain
27 standards for that. I don't know what the CDF – kind of training you all have to go through. I suspect it's
28 different, but I'm not sure.

1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: I think you'd be pleased to know that we are standardizing
2 training throughout California.

3 MAYOR VALLES: Good.

4 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: As a matter of fact, CDF, through the State Fire Marshall's
5 office, which is part of CDF, through the state fire training, under our direction, provides a lot of the
6 standards for that training. As Director Jones mentioned to you, the CCS program, the program of
7 certification of training and such, all of California is adhering to that. The federal fire agencies are using a
8 standard that is recognized, CDF uses a standard that is recognized, so we are all getting on the same page
9 of training. And I believe you'd be comforted to know that this standardized training is coming around
10 because we have had to go there because of unfortunate accidents and fatalities on fires, and as we examine
11 each of those situations, we look into our training processes and things like that that change. We certainly
12 do not want to have firefighters die on the fire lines, but we have to accept the fact that this is a dangerous
13 business, every day we come to work is a risk. And it's just the nature of the business that there will be
14 losses at some point in time, but we strive **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**.

15 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I remember when we were talking about standardizing equipment.

16 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Yes.

17 CHAIR CAMPBELL: We've got that accomplished, though, haven't we?

18 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Yes.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Alright. Mayor?

20 MAYOR VALLES: I'm through.

21 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay, thank you.

22 MAYOR VALLES: Thank you.

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, sir.

24 MR. MILLER: Thank you very much. I know you're supposed to have been done at 3:00, so I'll
25 try to be real brief here.

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That's all right. Oh, but you're right, you're right.

27 MR. MILLER: Uh, have you got a copy of your Powerpoint presentation, they have a lot of data in
28 there and information I think I'd – it would be really helpful to have it in hard copy.

1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Can you make that available?

2 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes.

3 MR. MILLER: And also –

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I'll make that available to the members of the commission.

5 MR. MILLER: That'd be great. Mr. Chair, I want to ask you – and maybe this is for DIRECTOR
6 JONES and Mr. Wright, both, the **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)** of our recommendations, would it be helpful to
7 the commission if we had some dollar estimates of the cost of those recommendations to review and
8 consider?

9 CHAIR CAMPBELL: We will take a look at that. Some of them will be extremely expensive. I
10 mean, if you want to re-do all the communications, you're talking about \$5, \$6 billion dollars.

11 MR. MILLER: Right. And then another question –

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: And I don't see that in the \$15 billion they're going after.

13 MR. MILLER: That's another bond. The other question I had was, you provided us some copies
14 of some maps where the CDF has identified the fire hazard zones throughout the state, and one thing I
15 noticed in review those maps is that from county to county one area may be an extreme high hazard area,
16 but right adjacent to it in the next county, it's not. It's something else. And I recognize that counties and
17 local governments have authority to overreach and make a different determination. I'm wondering, has that
18 affected all CDF's ability to allocate resources? Identify where to put resources? Where fires may
19 potentially come up, and that kind of thing?

20 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: No, it has not, and that's because of where we see those
21 differences, and when we were in your office explaining those maps, is that in those jurisdictional changes
22 of county line to county line, each of those counties have the ability accept that information on fire severity
23 zones, or they could adopt something differently. That's a local responsibility area that CDF is not
24 responsible for, unless it's under a contractual agreement where we are functioning as that county entity to
25 make that recommendation to the county body in their general plan applications as to designation of high
26 and very high fire severity zones.

27 MR. MILLER: Okay. One of the issues Ms. Kehoe's been asked to look at is an old issue of, well
28 you discussed it a little bit in your presentation, the availability of federal surplus aircraft equipment and

1 resources. There's a legislation that would have given, I believe, OES additional authority to take that
2 surplus equipment, rebuild new equipment and make it available to local government, much the way you
3 do with fire trucks and other equipment. We've been asked to look at that for CDF and give you guys that
4 authority. One thing you said is that equipment, that stuff is drying up. Is this something we're pursuing or
5 even looking at all anymore?

6 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: No, we – obviously look at all and try to squeeze the best out of
7 that program as we can. But as we look long term, several years down the road, we see that the equipment
8 available that we had the ability to get through that system actually drying up because of the down size in
9 the military, there's not as much of that equipment available, and, you know, the transition of type of
10 resources, you know, any kind of varying type of property from a truck to a helicopter to a aircraft that has
11 changed over time that we have adapted to our use. So it's not to say it's dried up today, we could
12 probably go find out. Our aviation staff constantly monitors what's available out there because, how we
13 have in essence run a \$20 million aerial firefighting program in CDF on a \$9 million budget is that the
14 great work that our aviation staff has squeezed out of the federal excess program to acquire parts basically
15 for free to operate our helicopter and our air tanker fleet that are still available to us. Now, you know,
16 again, these aircraft are getting up in age so that parts availability is starting to dwindle. That's where
17 we're getting concerned, is the parts availability, as well as the air frame availability that we would have
18 through that program.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I promise not to talk about the super scooper today.

20 [Laughter.]

21 MR. MILLER: Thank you very much.

22 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Any other questions? Yes, sir.

23 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Just very briefly, uh, going back to the readiness
24 available of the National Guard aircraft that you spoke about earlier – am I correct in my understanding that
25 that was predicated on the fact that the national fire readiness level that is coordinated by the National
26 Interagency Fire Center was at a low level, and the availability would be greater if the national readiness
27 level had been higher?

28

1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: I believe so, yes. When that was raised, then actually we would
2 be getting into the federal activation of those **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)** units nationwide, so that would be
3 one factor in that. But we have the luxury here in California to have two readily available to us.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes?

5 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Just very quickly, there's been a lot of talk about the
6 aircraft situation. Understandable, that's very visible and public and kind of glitzy. And yet the first
7 recommendation that you gave right out of the box was, we need that fourth person on the crews. I wonder
8 if you could address the degree to which air power has been oversold in the public's mind as a substitute
9 for strong, well-trained people on the ground, and also whether or not perhaps there's a general predilection
10 to, uh, that our general predilection to look at the latest and snazziest has prevented us from looking at the
11 basics.

12 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: Yes, excellent comment you make. You know, aerial
13 firefighting resources are a vital resource to the overall fire suppression tools that we have available to us.
14 What we have seen, and personally what I have seen over the last three years when we have had wind-
15 driven fire situations, is the hue and cry about why aren't aircraft flying, you know, they should be able to
16 fly, it's the most visible thing you see, the red stuff that drops out of the aircraft. The statement of
17 overstating their worth may be there, but they are valuable. But when I've seen the most critical issues
18 come out has been under these wind-driven fire situations where, in fact, aircraft utilization, especially
19 fixed wing aircraft, are ineffective. Anything over a 35 mph wind over low ground, the turbulence coming
20 off a ridgeline, and things like that. Again, as I stated in the previous meeting, these air tanker pilots do a
21 wonderful job. They fly under the most adverse condition, you know, probably as close to war time
22 conditions as we can get in their line of work. Imaging descending, dropping a payload of hundreds and
23 hundreds and hundreds of pounds of weight and pulling out of a canyon area in time before colliding with
24 hillside, this is just tremendous work they do. Add wind to that situation and turbulence associated with
25 that, that is very, very dangerous.

26 The public has viewed that as the ultimate, it may have become a perception and an overstated
27 situation that aircraft put out fires. Well, unless it's a direct hit on a spot by a helicopter or an air tanker
28 drop, maybe the spot's as big as this table, and they're that good with accuracy, it might be the case, but in

1 most situations, that is not the case. Their job is to be part of the suppression team effort to retard, to slow,
2 the spread of the fire until the ground resources can get there and start control lines. It's the ground
3 resources that totally extinguish fires. It's not the aircraft. The aircraft support them, they're a very, very
4 important tool in the overall suppression sources we have. We have overstated that, and I think we have to
5 go out and do a better job. Some of those questions that I shared with you about interference and things.
6 We had questions and such—well, if you can't fly, why are the media helicopters flying? Well, pretty
7 simple. They fly at a high altitude and they've got those zoom lenses that makes it look like they're right
8 there. They can do that. We're flying at a lower level, and in a high turbulence situation, we'll ground
9 them. As I mentioned to you in the last meeting, and I believe I shared the situation where we had air
10 tanker pilots grounding themselves because of cracked windshields and sheets of plywood flying by them.
11 Very, very dangerous situation. However, we have had this perception that if the tankers aren't flying, we
12 have, we're at the gates of hell, I guess. And, you know, we have to do a better job in educating the value
13 of those and that they are part of the overall resource.

14 Aircraft utilization is very expensive. As we look at issues that we tasked with as fire managers
15 dealing with cost containment on fires, aerial firefighting is very, very expensive on major fires. As we try
16 to control that and better utilize aircraft, if it's the public's desire to see planes flying around and dropping
17 red stuff that's just blowing away in the wind, and if they want to continue to fund that for a good feeling,
18 we could do that. But as a manager of a budget, you know, it's inefficient and it's a safety issue. Safety of
19 utmost to flying conditions like that to put pilots at risk, assets at risk, and the public at risk, along with
20 firefighters on the ground to operate in wind conditions like that.

21 CHAIR CAMPBELL: You know, Chief, in the past we have lost a number of planes. We have a
22 pretty good safety record this year, don't we?

23 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: We have an outstanding safety record. If we go back and look
24 at history how our programs progressed, um, you know, I have to knock on wood. We have a really great
25 aerial firefighting safety record compared to the amount of hours that we fly and the conditions
26 **(UNINTELLIGIBLE).**

27 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Have we lost any aircraft this year?

28 DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT: We have not lost any CDF aircraft.

1 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I'd say knock on wood, but this day and age it's tough to find wood.
2 Knock on plastic, maybe that'll do it. We're going to take a break now, ladies and gentlemen, for about –
3 we will reconvene shortly after the hour of 1600, or 4:00, for those of you who can't remember the 24-hour
4 **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**.

5 **[Break ends]**

6 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Alright, next we'll have the testimony from the National Guard, General
7 Monroe, the Adjutant General for the state of California, Colonel Davis, Director of Operations, Colonel
8 **KNEALON**, the Army Guard Operations also; Lieutenant Colonel John Crocker of the Air Guard
9 Operations of the California Military Department. Now, I know, General, you have a bit of a problem with
10 laryngitis? You know, for a politician, that's described as a catastrophic illness. [Laughter.] But I don't
11 think it applies to the military, so I know it's hard for you to talk, but if you could make a few comments,
12 then I guess we can leave the others on your right and left to make the presentation.

13 GENERAL MONROE: Thank you, sir. Jeff Davis is our operations officer, and he'll actually give
14 the presentation, and **KNEALON** and John Crocker are subject matter experts, there is nothing that you
15 could ask, absolutely nothing that they don't know the answer to. So I have every confidence –

16 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay. Do they know where the men's room is?

17 GENERAL MONROE: Oh, that's –

18 CHAIR CAMPBELL: They figured that out a long time ago, right?

19 GENERAL MONROE: I would like to turn it over to Jeff Davis for the presentation.

20 CHAIR CAMPBELL: We understand – your voice problem. Thank you for being here, though,
21 General, we appreciate it.

22 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, members of the commission, I know that a good deal of what we're
23 going to talk about has already been covered, so I'm going to do my best in the interest of your time to
24 paraphrase my prepared remarks. I've already given copies to the executive secretary. If I make any
25 mistakes at all, I'll just refer everything to Kim Zagaris from OES.

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Alright.

27 MR. DAVIS: Um, I want to make one personal note. The first fire I ever saw, urban woodland
28 fire, was from my front yard here in San Bernardino **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)** binoculars almost 50 years

1 ago and watching these great guys up and down the front range there trying to put out a fire. I was
2 fascinated at that time, I've continued to be fascinated, and now I get some degree of pleasure in the fact
3 that we're a small part of the effort with these great agencies that we work with. I also want to make a
4 note, Deputy DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT was right on when he talked about the danger that comes
5 from flying these missions. These two gentlemen to my extreme left have both got a lot of experience as
6 aviators, Dan **KNEALON** specifically, has flown in combat in Vietnam, as well as flown firefighting
7 missions here in the state of California. And Dan would tell you, as he's told me, that the firefighting
8 missions are far more dangerous than what he and I experienced in Vietnam. It's just the nature of the kind
9 of animal that we're dealing with.

10 Again, as I said, I have prepared remarks. I'm going to try paraphrase, so very quickly, the
11 reference that has already been given to us being able to provide assistance to California firefighting
12 authorities is the California Interagency Military Helicopter Firefighting Program. It provides us our
13 authority for both support for deployment and for training, and as has previously been said by both of the
14 two previous speakers, it was signed by the California National Guard, the California Department of
15 Forestry and Fire Protection, the U.S. Forest Service, and the National Park Service. As you know, our
16 mission in the previous fires and in others is to provide assets to civilian first responders. In the case of the
17 previous mission two months ago, California National Guard and other National Guard aircraft that were
18 brought in support of us, flew a total of 647 sorties. Quite a lot, and we're proud of that.

19 What I'd like to do now is specifically discuss the responses to the questions that were in your
20 letter, Mr. Chairman, on the 21st of November.

21 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Before we get into that –

22 MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir.

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Can you answer the question that Jerry – Congressman Lewis – asked me
24 to ask? And that is,

25 MR. DAVIS: The Economy Act?

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: No. That is, is there any reason that we can't call on the military, not the
27 National Guard, but the military for help without utilizing all the private sector first? Is there a law to that
28 affect? Is there any impediment to that?

1 MR. DAVIS: I would defer the question as to the Economy Act to someone else as regards to the
2 federal authorities. Yes, sir?

3 GENERAL MONROE: One of the things is uh, for fires we respond to OES, so once that,
4 whatever the impediment is, is worked out, we respond.

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I know that, I was asking more about the – there were complaints that you
6 had helicopters down at Camp Pendleton that could have been used – now, whether their pilots are trained
7 because, you know, we train pilots on firefighting and then they're shipped out to Iraq or Afghanistan or
8 Germany, or somewhere, and can we get that – do you want to handle that?

9 MR. DAVIS: Well, sir, that – I think your question is can we directly task active component forces
10 to fight fires?

11 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, sir.

12 MR. DAVIS: And the answer to that is, maybe. And I know that's a wishy washy answer, and I'm
13 sorry to do that to you, but you brought up several salient points, the first being the training fees and
14 whatnot, and the specificity of CDF and the U.S. Forest Service and the application of those assets to fires,
15 it's a difficult process. We have used active component forces, aircraft specifically, on fires, and if you
16 recall approximately 10 to 12 years ago in the Yellowstone fire in Idaho, uh, in Wyoming, active duty
17 forces went up there and fought that fire, they dropped water. However, no training was set up, it was very
18 ad hoc other last minute training, and it was not the most effective process.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: On Camp Pendleton, if they have a fire on that, who handles that?

20 MR. DAVIS: The Camp Pendleton installation commander is responsible for any installation.

21 CHAIR CAMPBELL: And so, he's – do they have firefighting – obviously they train their pilots
22 in dropping water I would assume, their helicopter pilots, or do they?

23 MR. DAVIS: I do not know the answer to that question. I did hear, though, and this is anecdotal,
24 sir, that they did drop water on fires at Camp Pendleton.

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I guess one of the other problems with that is that, you train a group of
26 pilots, uh, helicopter pilots, to do that, and then they're deployed elsewhere. And you bring in new people
27 – and there is a significant difference between their other normal activities of dropping troops off, or
28 protecting troops, and fighting a fire. The fire creates its own wind, it creates its own thermals, uh,

1 whatever, and its entirely different from the – and then again, you have to get – of course at Pendleton I’m
2 not sure you have too many telephone lines or wires running across there.

3 MR. DAVIS: Well, plus the added complexity of interoperability, as the Mayor pointed out,
4 communications available to the incident commander to employ those assets, there’s just a myriad of
5 problems to employ the area.

6 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yeah, I understand we would have difficulty communicating with, uh, we
7 can’t communicate with the federal pilots – with the pilots in the regular Army and the Air Force.

8 MR. DAVIS: Well we, that’s correct, and uh, in fact, all our aircraft are modified for special radios
9 that we drop in our aircraft so we can communicate on the bands that the Forest Service and CDF uses.

10 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay. Thank you.

11 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Mr. Chairman, excuse me – oh, I’m sorry.

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, sir.

13 **Mr. VERGA:** Pardon me if I could. This would probably be a good time to make a particular
14 point that I think is important for people to understand. It is the official written policy of the Department of
15 Defense that any local military commander can commit resources in support of a local community to save
16 lives, prevent great property damage and destruction. So the idea that military resources that were able to
17 fight a fire would sort of stand by and watch the local, you know, the surrounding community burn, it’s just
18 not the case. The technical issues of whether they’re qualified to drop water and all those things we’re
19 working with them are very significant issues. But there is no procedural, regulatory or legal prohibition on
20 that with the exception of, they can’t do anything which inhibits the military readiness of the Armed Forces
21 of the United States to defend the country.

22 With regard to the question on the Economy Act, I think if I could suggest, I will go back and I will
23 have somebody from the Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, give an official interpretation of
24 the Economy Act and just answer that question. It’s my understanding and our lawyers have told us,
25 there’s no legal prohibition in the Economy Act that prevents Economy Act transfers between departments
26 that is predicated on the exhaustion of all reasonable commercial resources. But I can get an official ruling
27 from the lawyers.

28

1 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you, I appreciate that. I recognize that after we get that, even if
2 we're allowed to do that, we still have the training, the communication, and the problems –

3 MR. DAVIS: Oh, yes. And those are very significant issues.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, they are. Alright. Yes, sir. Thank you. Uh, yes, sir?

5 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Question, uh, on the Economy Act, and I've heard it
6 explained a couple different ways so when we get the information back, specifically my question is, can
7 you request active duty military to support local civil authorities prior to exhausting all private entities that
8 provide air support? That would be the question I would have.

9 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That'd be part of your question? Thank you.

10 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Thank you.

11 MR. DAVIS: Mr. Chairman, the Secretary made a point when he talked about regular military
12 readiness, and I think that's the key for the DOD – I don't speak for DOD – but in 30 years as a regular
13 Army officer, I moved 25 times. The military is either preparing to deploy or is deployed in the current
14 state of circumstances around the world. And so it is a very real question for military commanders as to
15 whether or not they would have the time to devote to this kind of training as opposed to the other kind of
16 war fighting requirements. Nevertheless, that's not our question to answer, that's really the DOD's.

17 Let me talk some more then about what the Guard possesses. You know we have a number of
18 aircraft, we have both a fixed wing aircraft – the numbers have already been given, but I'll repeat them.
19 We've got ten C-130's in the state. But what's really important is we've got the two MAFFS units, the
20 Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems, both of those, it's been correctly already stated, belong to the U.S.
21 Forest Service and they maintain them. So we have two in the state of California, there are a total of six
22 others across the country, two in Colorado –

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: These are 130's?

24 MR. DAVIS: These are the sets that fit into the back of the 130. And they deploy –

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: In case you jump out of the 130. I love that. Cause prior to that I jumped
26 out of the 119. That was noisy.

27 MR. DAVIS: I made the 119 on my first jump. You're right. But these fit into the back of the
28 130. There are six of them across the country, other than ours, two in Wyoming, two in Colorado, two in

1 North Carolina. We got all eight of them into California during this mission. So that's really the key
2 number is the fact that we –

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Can they go into any 130?

4 MR. DAVIS: John? Can they go into any 130?

5 MR. CROCKER: They can't go into any 130, but they can go into **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**.

6 CHAIR CAMPBELL: And are those the most prevalent 130's around?

7 MR. CROCKER: Yes, sir, they can go into the majority of 130's available. And in California we
8 are getting two new "J models, in fact we have them, which will have new MAFFS systems in them.

9 MR. DAVIS: They're the Air Force, the other international guard assets that are important is
10 something that's a modification of Black Hawk, it's called **(UNINTELLIGIBLE Pave?)** Hawk. We can
11 use those for transportation, we can use them for reconnaissance, or whatever. The key assets in the Army
12 National Guard are of course are Chinooks, our big CH47's, and our Black Hawk helicopters. Whereas the
13 MAFF units can drop up to 3,000 gallons at the same time, with the Black Hawks we can drop between 660
14 and 780 gallons, the Chinooks can drop more, they can drop about 2,000 gallons. The MAFF, the
15 advantage of those is they can drop more, but then they have to go back to a fixed airfield. In our case, it's
16 Channel Islands at Point Magoo.

17 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I thought the Chinook could **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**.

18 MR. DAVIS: No, I'm talking about the MAFFS. In the case of the Chinooks, the advantage is
19 they can't carry as much weight, but they can set down anywhere and draw the water right out of a lake, a
20 stream, or somewhere else. They're both used depending on what the mission is by the fire managers.

21 We've also got a heck of a lot of trucks – I won't go into that in the interest of your time. One of
22 the questions you asked was the number of non-firefighting resources that we might have available and
23 whether or not we need a contract or assistance for hire or those kind of assets. And what I would say is,
24 strictly speaking that question does not apply to the California National Guard because we are a provider
25 agency as opposed to being a customer. However, in the larger context, we did request support from across
26 the country. As I've already explained, we've got all of the MAFFS, 130's, from across the country. We
27 were also were able to pull in three Chinooks from the state of Nevada on a handshake deal. We also
28 pulled in two aircraft from Oregon, and we would have pulled in several aircraft from the state of

1 Washington. However, there we had some legal problems in the state of Washington, they could not
2 deploy there troops here in what essentially is a state active duty status. They could have deployed troops
3 here if California had been a signatory of EMAC.

4 CHAIR CAMPBELL: And why are we not a signatory to that?

5 MR. DAVIS: Sir, I think, uh, one of the recommendations is that we're going to have is that we
6 take a look at that. There are number of reasons I think on both sides as to why we should or shouldn't, and
7 I certainly respect the differences there, but I think it is worth discussing whether or not we take EMAC
8 and put it as another arrow in our quiver. Doesn't mean we have to use it, but as another arrow in our
9 quiver in case we have to.

10 CHAIR CAMPBELL: It's a (UNINTELLIGIBLE) agreement, right?

11 MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, it is, and it's national and there're 48 states involved. California's an
12 exception.

13 The other question you asked was, discuss how the various resources are activated and coordinated
14 in combating fires. Now this is basically going to be a repeat of what the two previous gentlemen said, but
15 I'll do it anyway for clarity. The usual method is that we get a request. That request may come from the
16 U.S. Forest Service, it may come from the California Department of Forestry, it goes to OES. And we have
17 a very close relationship with all those agencies, specifically with OES, in that they give us the tasking
18 authority. They have the tasking authority, they give us the mission. We receive the mission and we
19 immediately alert our assets and essentially it's a fairly easy process to go through. It's fairly quick, it's
20 very responsive, they will often pre-alert us and we start working on the mission and then they give us the
21 mission number and then we move on. Bob Gerber sitting there to your right is one of the guys that is
22 frequently calling us for those.

23 You also asked about any jurisdictional, operational, or training barriers that prevent the
24 expeditious use or response of any of our resources, especially federal or National Guard military
25 resources. We don't have any jurisdictional issues that we face because as I previously stated, we are
26 signatories of the four-party agreement. So we don't have any jurisdictional problems when OES gives us a
27 mission number, we can respond. Training programs are not an issue, either. We've got very good training
28 programs and as Deputy DEPUTY DIRECTOR WRIGHT mentioned, in fact, California has got the model

1 for the nation, uh, it's going to be regionalized for the western region and in fact Col. **KNEALON** just last
2 month was back in Nashville working to try to get it nationalized. So we don't have a problem with the
3 training program itself. Where we do have a problem is in funding the training. Let me be very explicit.
4 We get 95% of our funding in the military department from the federal government for federal missions,
5 federal military missions. Firefighting is not one of those. So, if we want to train **[SIDE A ENDS; SIDE**
6 **B BEGINS]** or retardant, we have to be very creative on how we provide that training. I won't waste your
7 time to talk about the strategies that we use, but basically we can do it. It's very difficult, we skate pretty
8 close to the line, we don't go over the line. If we want to have more training for crews, then were going to
9 have to provide state resources to do that. Otherwise I have to be creative and pulling it out of other funds.
10 That stinks, but that's the answer.

11 CHIEF ZAGARIS: Uh, Chairman?

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes, sir?

13 CHIEF ZAGARIS: Kim Zagaris. Um, I think this is probably one of the more crucial issues. If
14 we're going to fix the other DOD issue, I think that as we've been talking, I've been working with the Cal
15 Guard and some of the other western aviation units in the country, the National Guard Bureau needs to
16 change its mission – needs to add firefighting to the mission of the guards around the country. That's the
17 point of my recommendation because by doing that, it provides additional funds, training opportunities,
18 maintenance, a whole bunch of areas that are desperately needed so we can, not have to continue to run the
19 gauntlets, as I call them, out there. Currently, CDF has provided the VHF radios, the buckets, a lot of the
20 other guard units around the country have not been able to meet this capability. And this is one of the
21 strengths of California, but the downfall is we really need to get the National Guard Bureau, MAFFS and
22 DOD to make firefighting part of the national mission. By doing so I think would be a tremendous benefit.

23 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Chief, thank you. And let me at this time introduce James Peterson,
24 representing United States Senator Diane Feinstein, and with Mr. Peterson and Congressman Lewis's
25 representatives still here, we'll convey this request to the proper authorities.

26 MR. PETERSON: Thank you. I'd like to comment on Kim Zagaris's remarks concerning DOD or
27 National Guard Bureau certified (**UNINTELLIGIBLE**), just so you know, Kim, we've instituted that
28 through the National Guard Bureau, sanctioning through the Army's Evaluation Standardization

1 Department of Fort Rucker, without going into a lot of detail, it's our authorization body for helicopter
2 tasks, Army helicopter tasks, and I'm confident that that will be added as a task. We have all the systems
3 in place to do that. So, that should work out just fine. And it'll be part of our western regional firefighting
4 training, and hopefully our national program.

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay. Colonel, go ahead.

6 MR. DAVIS: We were talking about the training of crews. I also want to mention, we talked
7 about Army aviation for just a moment. In terms of the MAFFS training, that's not a problem. Because
8 it's a federal requirement, a federal training requirement, federally mandated, uh, I have no problem in
9 training those crews at all. And I'm not aware of any other barriers that would prevent the expeditious use
10 of those MAFF birds. Uh, you're next question requested information on the inter, or intrastate mutual-aid
11 agreements, contracts for hire agreements, or other arrangements that we might be involved in that might
12 constitute -- or those that might constitute barriers. I previously mentioned the interagency program that we
13 have here in California, and we review that every two years. We've also had a lot of talk about the
14 Economy Act. I'm not an expert in the Economy Act, but I would say this: strictly speaking, the Act -- and
15 I'll be very careful with my words here -- strictly speaking, the Act does not serve the barrier to our
16 deployment. When we get a call from OES, we deploy, we don't worry about the issue. I think, though,
17 that it is an impediment to others who do their darnedest to go through and make sure that they've checked
18 all the blocks before they call the guard. Now I respect, and I agree with Deputy DEPUTY DIRECTOR
19 WRIGHT said that sometimes they'll kind of look out ahead and they may alert the guard or call the guard
20 and just give us advance notice. That does occur. But I would remind you then that in the 12 or 24 hours
21 that they're looking out to see if there are any contractors out there who can fill, we still have not mobilized
22 the guard. We may have called people, but we haven't brought them to duty. One of the recommendations
23 that I will make toward the end is, maybe we want to consider bringing some crews in and paying them
24 early, if we have to in those cases. We won't abuse that. If we can use fulltime crews that happen to be on
25 board, we bring those in first. But in some cases, maybe it's worth spending a few dollars to bring them in
26 early so that we've saved ourselves that 12 to 24 hours if we have to deploy. And I would say that, while
27 we're not exactly a first responder agency, we are the first military responder agency. And therefore an act,
28 which for very valid reasons was created I think in 1933, it may be 1934, and was modified in 1996, maybe

1 it's time to take a look at that again and see if it should apply toward the National Guard. I'm not sure that
2 it should.

3 What's also been mentioned by Director Jones is that California is involved in an interstate civil
4 defense and disaster compact with neighboring states, uh, that is true. In fact, that's how we – we didn't
5 exactly activate it on our side, but that's what we use essentially with a handshake agreement to get the
6 helicopters out of Nevada and it worked quite well. If California had been a member of EMAC, as are the
7 other 48 states, we would have been able to get – as I said previously – we would have been able to get the
8 birds out of the state of Washington.

9 Finally, you asked us to provide recommendations to enhance our firefighting capabilities to
10 combat fires. We have several recommendations. The first is that we would recommend that we establish
11 protocols for the use of a Predator-type UAV, the remote, unpiloted aerial vehicles. And when I say the
12 Predator, what we do is we would give DOD capabilities and they would come up with whatever asset that
13 would work. But we think that the success that it's had in Afghanistan, the success it's had in Iraq,
14 certainly points to the possible use for it here in the country for a variety of different purposes.

15 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Does the National Guard have access to Predator?

16 MR. DAVIS: No, sir, we do not. We do not. We are working, we're working that right now, but
17 we do not have the assets available. And I'll tell you quite frankly that it's, they have been used so much in
18 the last couple years, the regular Air Force just doesn't have enough to go around. However, we did have a
19 way of getting access to that in the previous fires, had permission been granted.

20 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Let me ask, is there a problem – I guess maybe I should say – is there a
21 problem with the Predator flying? Of course, they fly at what, 18,000 feet or something like that, with a
22 camera?

23 MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir, their normal environment is between 8,000 and 18,000 but pragmatically, in
24 the United States we're talking about above 18,000 somewhere so that we can be in the positive controlled
25 air space.

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: In a fire situation, we restrict space above the fire area, don't we? We don't
27 allow commercial flights and that through there.

28

1 MR. DAVIS: That's right, we do have temporary flight restrictions over fires. Of some interest is
2 in this particular event, L.A. center did in fact cordon off air space for utilization of an unmanned aerial
3 vehicle over the Cedar fire specifically, and they were quite rapid about making that happen so it is a
4 doable issue.

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: So we had an unmanned aircraft, or they just made the space?

6 MR. DAVIS: No, sir, we got all – no, sir, we did not. We had the air space cordoned off and the
7 vehicle was delayed and never got that completed.

8 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Well, they sure took care of a few terrorists in Saudi Arabia here a few
9 months back. A whole carload. That's quite a piece of equipment.

10 GENERAL MONROE: Uh, this was the first time that the Predator had been requested, and I
11 think that's what caused the delay.

12 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. The Air National Guard really was leaning out to try to be leading edge
13 on this, and had we gotten it, I think we would establish a precedent and maybe frankly it was just a little –
14 as a personal aside, my own personal feel is that maybe it was just too early for some folks to establish that
15 precedent, but I think it's worth pushing the envelope and asking the question.

16 CHAIR CAMPBELL: The cameras and cut through the smoke and everything, uh, with the
17 infrared, and –

18 MR. DAVIS: Yes, sir. They can cut through the smoke.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay.

20 MR. DAVIS: We also recommend, and I do recognize and respect the various considerations on
21 this and reservations, but I do recommend that a debate begin in California as to whether or not we should
22 become members of EMAC. I've already said, we also should consider placing some elements on a funded
23 status prior to the need to put them into a fire. In other words, in some cases, if we know we're going to
24 have a fire, if we do have a fire, we know we might be called, let's spend the bucks, let's bring the crews
25 in, if they don't fly, we stand them down. We can find other things for them to do during that period of
26 time to make sure they're being trained, so we're not going to waste their time, but it may give us 12 to 24
27 hours advance notice if the fire personnel need us. I would also say that we should consider, whether this is
28 with federal funding or state funding is not my call, but I think we should consider buying a couple of state

1 MAFF systems, or the replacement model, which is AFFS. As I said, the ones that we already have are the
2 U.S. Forest Service . . .

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: How much do they cost?

4 MR. DAVIS: Sir, I've been told that a couple might cost us around \$5 million. I do not know the
5 answer. John says that's roughly correct. Now, along with that then we'd have to give CDF the authority
6 to contract with Montesano to make sure that they're fillable. But it would give us some more capacity out
7 here in a state that's got 35 million people, a heck of a lot of fire lands, urban wild land interfaces and
8 whatever.

9 I also said that I would recommend, and we do recommend, that some consideration be given to
10 state training dollars for aviation assets. We would recommend the nationwide training standard be set,
11 such as what have been working on with the fire friends in the western region in which we're trying to set
12 nationwide. Now, we were part of EMAC that means we could theoretically bring in crews from Texas,
13 Oklahoma, North Dakota, Montana, who would already be trained at the same standards that our pilots are.

14 And finally, we would recommend that consideration be given, consideration be given to allowing
15 National Guard people to be paid in Title 32 and to fight these fires. Let me explain what that means. We
16 have three ways in which we can pay our people. There's Title 10, that's federal pay and they're on the
17 federal payroll and they work for the federal government. There's Title 32 that's also federal payroll, but
18 they work for the governor. And there's state active duty where the state pays.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: We like the first two better than the third option. [Laughter.]

20 UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Why am I not surprised? [Laughter.]

21 MR. DAVIS: Well, the reason for the 32, the Title 32, might in many cases, streamline the
22 payment process where the money just comes straight down the state from the U.S. Forest Service, and we
23 put troops out there, or whatever, as we need to. So, those are our **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**
24 recommendations. I've tried to paraphrase my remarks in order to save time and not repeat what we said
25 before. But subject to your questions, this concludes our remarks. We'll be ready to take any of your
26 questions that you may desire to submit.

27 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Do any of the rest of you have anything to say? Alright, are there questions
28 from members of the commission? Yes, Jim?

1 MR. JACKSON: How would the Predators be used?

2 MR. DAVIS: John, you want to answer that?

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: See if it – does it work?

4 MR. CROCKER: I believe it does. I think the most practical answer to that is, the capability the
5 Predator brings, besides being able to see the fire line and look through the smoke is long-linger time. So I
6 would suggest to you that they would be used in an orbit above a fire, or series of fires. They would
7 provide real time information to the firefighters and incident commanders so that could do an assessment of
8 the fire line, that would certainly be one area. And, pragmatically again, at night, when you have a great
9 deal of difficulty analyzing what the fire is doing, and I will reference the Cedar fire specifically, you may
10 not be able to mitigate all the circumstances, but you certainly know that your problem is developing. That
11 is a significant issue, and in this particular case, might have had a strong effect.

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: In a Santa Ana wind condition, is the, is that impact on the Predator at say
13 18,000 or 20,000 feet or something like?

14 MR. CROCKER: It is possible, I think. The answer is normally they would fly successfully at
15 18,000 feet, unaffected by the Santa Anas, but it is possible to have turbulence that would create a problem.

16 **UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER:** Mr. Chairman?

17 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Yes?

18 **UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE SPEAKER:** Just a follow up on the Predator, uh, one of the issues,
19 we were considering using it in this fire siege, was the issue of liability and the very high cost which then
20 were a matter of debate. How would that be handled?

21 MR. CROCKER: I have some background information, but in reality I'm not qualified to answer
22 the question. That would be a DOD question, I think, that would have to be answered. The liability, as I
23 understand within the state of California was accepted, and in truth, eventually when the weapon system
24 becomes more common, we'll have the same liability that a C130 or a helicopter has, there is no real
25 difference except for the fact, it's a new concept.

26 MR. DAVIS: One point I think germane to that is that one of the considerations and the decision
27 on whether to improve the use of the Predator or not was, it has a significantly higher mishap rate than
28 manned aircraft due in great deal to its experimental and newly developed nature. So, the considered risk –

1 and remember, it's designed to fly in a combat situation over an area that you don't care very much if an
2 airplane crashes in, it's not designed to fly over the United States, where you would be very considered if
3 the aircraft would suffer a mishap, you could have the worse of all worlds and it could go down and start
4 another fire somewhere else, or worse yet, land in a populated area. So that, those were some of the many
5 things that went into consideration on the decision of whether to approve the Predator or not.

6 MR. CROCKER: I agree with the secretary. However, I also believe, and sir, if I'm wrong, please
7 correct me. I also believe that the United States Air Force has chosen to purchase Predators without the
8 parachute system that would be available for some small amount of money, I don't know what that is, small
9 in terms of federal payrolls, and I would certainly recommend that if we were putting in a Predator over the
10 state of California, then we have that recovery system which is essentially a parachute that just pops out
11 and lowers it to the ground.

12 MR. DAVIS: In fact, sir, I'll add to that. The predators are all tested in California with ballistic
13 recovery parachutes attached to them, and they are removed. And I think it is a pragmatic question, I think
14 we should in fact look at that for safety, but I think there are answers to those kinds of questions, I don't
15 think it's a complete red line.

16 **UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER:** And we can be reasonably assured that nobody's going to
17 be shooting at us.

18 MR. FUKUTOMI: Mr. Chairman?

19 MR. FUKUTOMI: I've got a common interest on this, because the request – if the state requests
20 that asset, it comes to us FEMA for a tasking to the Department of Defense, and I think the real question
21 here has to be, what is requirement, you know, what is it that you want to accomplish? Because there are a
22 number of assets that maybe will meet that other than the Predator, I don't think it's reasonable just to pin
23 everything on the hopes of one particular asset that DOD has that might not be the most appropriate asset.

24 MR. DAVIS: I'd like to answer that before John does, and he's the expert. As an emergency
25 operator, my answer to that would be this: we don't traditionally fly over these fires at night. Having
26 something up there that can loiter for long hours would have given our firefighters a lot of information that
27 they could have used to plot their strategy for the next day. And again, I say this not as a firefighter. I
28 think that's the answer. Now, where those fires would have gone in terms of what property destruction

1 would have been created, or what loss of life would have resulted, I can't answer that question, but it
2 seems to me it would be prudent to look at that. It also seems to me that California, having pushed
3 envelope on so many other things and being such a leader in so many other things, is the perfect
4 environment to test this. I mean, we don't know a lot of things that we don't know until we try them, and I
5 – that would be my response, and I prefer that John go ahead and continue in that he's the expert.

6 MR. CROCKER: Well, I will add to that if I may, I think we need to look at this a little bit
7 realistically. The question here is, should you ask for a capability, or should you ask for a specific item to
8 solve it? And in fact, I'll point out that OES's request was not for Predator, it was later assumed, and rather
9 realistically because it was probably the most realistic system, uh, at the same time I'll remind everybody
10 that we do not ask for a four-engine airplane that can spit **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)** out the back, we ask for a
11 MAFF because we understand that capability is what will solve the problem. When we do planning, we
12 ask for capability. When we're fighting a fire, we ask for MAFF's, and I think that needs to be applied, if
13 that makes sense. Predator made sense at the time, it was available and could have been used.

14 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you. Any other questions by committee members? Yes, sir?

15 **UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER:** Just one brief question. Could you pull that mike a little
16 closer? You said 48 states participated in EMAC. What's the other state besides California that doesn't?
17 And a little history on why we don't.

18 MR. DAVIS: Hawaii is the other state that does not participate. And in terms of history, it's really
19 not my call. I think probably someone from OES might give a better answer than I would. It has been
20 considered before. I think, and this is my own personal feeling, that there is some – and Director Jones
21 very adequately established some of the reasons that we might not want to be in – I think also there's a
22 concern that because we have so many resources here in California that there might be a net outgo of
23 resources as opposed to stuff coming in.

24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay. Mr. Secretary.

25 MR. VERGA: Just one other comment on the Economy Act, because it seems to be so central to
26 many of these discussions. I think it's important to remember that the Economy Act governs transactions
27 between federal departments and agencies. That is one federal department asking another federal
28 department to do something in providing the funds, the other department can do it if the funds are

1 reasonable available, and if it's determined by the head of the requesting agency that it cannot be as
2 conveniently or economically provided by a private contractor. That's sort of the essence of the Economy
3 Act. I know of nothing in the Economy Act that in any way inhibits the California state government asking
4 the California National Guard to undertake any mission inside the state of California. So that if OES, or the
5 California Division of Forestry, needs the MAFFS that the state of California has and needs them to go fly
6 a mission, the Economy Act does not come into play. You know, it would only come into play if the
7 Federal Emergency Management Agency were to ask the Department of Defense or the U.S. Forest Service
8 would ask Federal Emergency Management Agency to conduct some mission in support of that other
9 federal agency.

10 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you. Any other questions?

11 UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER: Not to beat a dead horse, and I just want to make sure
12 when you come with that, my question wasn't relative to the California National Guard or National Guard.
13 I think Kim Zaragis pointed out that Guard Bureau requests, potentially a recommendation could be to
14 make a request of the Guard Bureau, putting firefighting in the National Guard's bailiwick, much like the
15 Cal Guard has. I want to make sure that maybe my question wasn't clear. But I was really looking forward
16 – because having been in San Diego during the fires, and having dealt with media comments with respect to
17 three Navy helicopters that were sitting over there that weren't used, the answer I kept getting was, well,
18 there are a host of issues you need to go through. And I'm not talking about the radios, or the training, or
19 the certifications we can we, can local government, through the process, through the state, task active duty
20 Marine, Air Force, Army, or Navy assets to fly a fire mission, and if so, does the Economy Act play a role
21 there? It's just a question.

22 MR. DAVIS: And I will just again reiterate. In an emergency, the local government can request
23 the Department of Defense to respond to that emergency to save lives and property and to prevent great
24 destruction. The local commander has the authority, without recourse to higher authority, to undertake that
25 emergency support mission, regardless of the issues of reimbursement or anything else. That is all sorted
26 out later. So the Economy Act again wouldn't come into play. It comes into play when a federal agency
27 requests the Department of Defense to conduct an operation under the Economy Act for reimbursement. It
28 also doesn't come into play if there's a disaster declared and the reimbursement is under the **STAFFORD**

1 Act from generally the Federal Emergency Management Agency. But we'll get a nice clean, good
2 description of that because I think there has been a lot of misunderstanding of that and I think my
3 understanding of what happened in the San Diego area was it was the operational considerations that
4 principally precluded the use of the Navy helicopters. You know, they weren't trained and they didn't have
5 the right communications, those types of things, but we can certainly look very carefully at that.

6 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Chief, go ahead.

7 MR. ZAGARIS: Yeah, in regard to Col. Davis's comments, currently MAFF units after the 1993
8 fire siege, we came up with the procedure to shorten the readiness to get the MAFF units online much
9 quicker, and this year, much like the MAFF units, it allows (UNINTELLIGIBLE) process to bring the
10 C130's on, MAFF units, on earlier. This year also, the interagency agreement procedure also allowed the
11 helicopters to be put on alert status in following that same procedure, so it was actually something that was
12 put into place this year as one of the ways to again, shorten the response capability time and allow the
13 guard some opportunity to bring in some folks. If CDF makes a request we commission to ask you to put
14 them in alert status so you can bring your crews on, bring the aircraft from readiness status, to shorten that
15 response time. I'm not sure if you're aware of that, that's one item. The issue dealing with EMAC I think
16 as Director Jones earlier stated, probably one of our bigger issues has to do with liability. If California
17 were sign on to EMAC and we were to go to another state, our workers' comp would be under that state's
18 workers' comp, not taking with us our liabilities and our workers' comp issues and so forth when we go
19 into those other states. I can tell you I've been working with DHF FEMA, and I work currently, assigned
20 one of their committees, working on national mutual-aid issues. We are working with FEMA, or NEMA,
21 and we are discussing currently some changes to EMAC and one of the major changes is, currently you can
22 only use EMAC if you already have a president, or a gubernatorial-declared disaster, and we're looking to
23 try to work some things. Our legal counsel is currently working with NEMA, so there are some things in
24 the works, but there are some items that have kept California out of it. We actually probably send more
25 resources out of the state than we currently receive them along our borders, probably more so than anybody
26 else, as earlier discussed about mutual-aid from Arizona. The Imperial County operational area regularly
27 uses a Yuma City Fire Department engine to fill out their fifth engine, as an example, on a regular basis
28 when they send a strike team from Imperial someplace else in the state, just as a quick example. In the

1 Tahoe Basin on the Nevada side, we regularly use local government resources to fill out, some of our strike
2 comes out of our Tahoe Basin, and much of the same issues occur along our Oregon border, so we do
3 regularly do this. But it is something we are currently looking at, but there probably does need to be a
4 recommendation.

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you. Uh, next, Director Ray
6 Quintanar, the Fire and Aviation Management of the U.S. Department of Forest Service, and – you have to
7 turn that one on, I think, Ray, I think it's --

8 DIRECTOR QUINTANAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and commission board, we appreciate the
9 opportunity to talk about incident management capabilities of the Forest Service in California. We promise
10 we won't be looking at a breakfast menu.

11 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you! I've already changed one flight. I can't afford to change
12 another.

13 DIRECTOR QUINTANAR: Thank you. Ron Raley, our Deputy Director will also be giving part
14 of this presentation.

15 I want to do something a little bit different. That is I want to try and give you a scope of the fire
16 size and the scale of what was actually happening in southern California. So what we're going to do, if
17 you'll look up at the board up here, when I ask Dorothy to start this, you're going to start seeing the fire
18 starting to grow and I'm going to be tell you what happened with these fires, and then from that we'll stop
19 and go into a video, a short 30-second video or so, that will show some of the fire behavior, and then we'll
20 get into some of the issues and the six questions, and then we'll conclude with a few recommendations. So,
21 Dorothy, if you would start please?

22 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Before you go, Director, if anybody – we have, I think, one or two people
23 signed up, if anybody has not talked and wants to sign up, Blair is still down there at the end. Okay, go
24 ahead.

25 DIRECTOR QUINTANAR: Thank you, sir. On October 21, that's a Tuesday at 12:01 p.m., the
26 Roblar fire started, that's down in Camp Pendleton, followed by the Grand Prix fire at 1422 and then the
27 Pass fire at 1611. Nothing new started on Wednesday, but then on Thursday we had the Piru fire, which
28 was up north, and the Piru fire was in the Ventura County area. On Friday the 24th, the Verdale fire at 1307

1 and then at 1505 the Happy fire, L.A. County, the Verdale fire was Ventura, L.A., uh, Ventura with the
2 Happy fire. Then we go to Saturday the 25th, and on the 25th the Old fire in San Bernardino County, the
3 Simi fire, Ventura, and the L.A. County, and that's at 9:17 at 1450, and then we had the Cedar fire start in
4 San Diego at 1730. It's pretty obvious by this time we had a lot of problems on our hands, and as you can
5 see by the map and the scale in the distance, we had a lot of area to cover with the fire personnel that we
6 had.

7 On Sunday, at about 1:30, the Paradise fire, 11:45 – 0130 in the morning –11:45 the Mountain fire,
8 the Otay fire at 1300, and then the Wellman fire at 1305. All in San Diego County. And as you can see
9 from that, that there was a tremendous amount of distance to cover, and again these fires, on the last slide
10 that you see – the last slide that you see, that one, there – is, uh, on the 26th there was a major wind event
11 that started to occur and you can see the growth of acres that started to burn up throughout all these 14 or
12 15 fires. What I want to show you now is a little bit of a clip that happened on 10/25 at 1530 hours in the
13 Grand Prix fire, this was around Rancho Cucamonga at Haven and Archibald Avenue.

14 Now that fire was typical of what was going for several days, and what our fire personnel were
15 trying to egress and fight. These personnel that you see here were moving away from perimeter control,
16 realizing what they were going to have to do was go actually into the perimeter of the fire and start
17 structure protection. With those kinds of winds and that kind of a fire that was occurring and that kind of a
18 fire behavior, you can well imagine that they were on edge and certainly were worried about what they
19 were going to do with that.

20 Again, these fires at this time were burning somewhere in the vicinity, if you take the Cedar fire,
21 when that occurred, within 29 hours, uh, within 14 hours, that fire had gone through 29 miles of a whole lot
22 of communities and a whole lot of homes. These other fires were fairly close behind. So at this time these
23 personnel are moving out, and they're moving over to the structures cause they knew the best thing they
24 could do, they weren't going to save any trees or any of that sort of stuff, they were going to have to go
25 after the structures. And again, look at the kind of fire behavior and the kind of winds they were facing.

26 What I'd like to talk now about is the incident of potential. I want you to realize that this was no
27 surprise, what was happening here, what was about to happen. If I look at the February seasonal fire
28 outlook, the most critical areas that we identified in California were the southern forests, the four southern

1 forests, where we have a significant population and a limited means of egress into that area. The February
2 seasonal fire outlook also, as we are looking again on those forests, the concentrations of standing and dead
3 trees, as well as the brush **DIED BACK**. The evacuation and firefighting efforts in these communities was
4 in itself difficult and most dangerous, if it was to happen at all. The incident potential for this fire, as we
5 look at that, existed for a long time. This is nothing new that was happening. It was well recognized early
6 on that something needed to be done. If you read that last line in there, southern California has the highest
7 population in fire-prone urban interface areas in the U.S. That's pretty significant for us. When you look
8 at the Cedar fire – or excuse me, the **HAYMAN** fire that occurred in Colorado, that fire, as big as it was,
9 was only 147,000 acres and we're looking at several of these fires at well over, almost 750,000 acres. All
10 occurring at the same time. The incident potential continued to occur as we looked at long-term drought of
11 five years, we looked at widespread brush and timber mortality, and we were also looking at widespread
12 critical dry fuel. That is, the moisture and all these allegedly healthy trees and brush, etc., was practically
13 non-existent or down to a point where it was barely surviving. And then the last we have in the incident
14 potential, extended record high temperatures, low humidity, that is if you go outside and you look at night,
15 or in the morning, and you see dew on your lawn – there wasn't any. There wasn't any at night. Everything
16 was burning as readily at night as it was during the day. It was a 24-7 burn that we were facing.

17 Let's talk about the resources that we had as far as available resources for this incident, and I'm
18 just speaking about the Forest Service at this time. We look at the initial attack resource use, during this
19 11-day period, this is rather significant. This isn't about the forest service, but what happens with the
20 successful incident command system, a strong FIRESCOPE that supports that, but during this 11-day
21 period, a little over 1,725 fires were successfully attacked by interagency service efforts across the board,
22 seemingly effortless throughout the whole state. Averaging 157 fires a day, and if you can imagine, had
23 those taken off, besides the 15 that we were presently working on.

24 Now we start looking at the engine that the Forest Service had at this time, and we took October
25 21st, the morning of, we had 199 engines, we have about 275 or 280 all totaled, we had several of those
26 committed up north, also understand and remember I think Chief Wright said this at the last meeting that
27 we had, that during this time the east winds were throughout the whole state. So this wasn't something
28 where we could suddenly move stuff from the north and move it down south, cause we still had the issue of

1 fires of up there – as a matter of fact, we did have several fires that did occur up there. As far as the hand
2 crews that we had available, we had 39 on hand at that time in the state, we utilized all of those. Now the
3 air tankers, this is kind of an interesting number here, we usually have around eight air tankers in southern
4 California in our bases. Because the season was closed in the rest of the states, we had 21 air tankers sitting
5 in southern California. We had three more sitting up in northern California. What’s interesting, when we
6 start looking at the actual utilization of those air tanker hours, the total hours that they could have flown
7 and the actual utilization, we had more air tankers than we needed. Why? Well, the issue was you couldn’t
8 fly because of the smoke, because of the 4 by 8 sheets of plywood that were flying around in the air, and
9 the pilots had to sit down, and they just couldn’t fly because of the high winds that they had.

10 Helicopters, we had a 23 that we had available that day. And all of these were eventually utilized.
11 Now, on our helicopters, we have 12 to 14 people on all our initial attack helicopters, so we set a full crew
12 on the ground. Chief Wright had mentioned earlier, we talked about three firefighters per engine, we carry
13 five per engine, we have the luck of being able to do that, so that gives us an extra two people per engine
14 with greater capability. So we had a lot of resources available that day, in addition to that the additional
15 resource availability with other agency contracts that we had, this number of 4,316 additional resources,
16 from engines to bulldozers and water tenders, as well as heavy logistical equipment, etc., was available to
17 us and we did take advantage of a great deal of that. As I said, we’re not going to have a breakfast menu
18 here, so I’m going to hand it over to Ron, who wants and will talk about the agreements, how we actually
19 mobilize this and pre-planning that we do in order to get this on the ground.

20 MR. COLEMAN: Mr. Chairman, your letter asked about the agency’s agreements and how we
21 bring the assets to bear in our fire program in California and I’m proud to tell you that I am going to repeat
22 a lot of what Director Dallas Jones had to say, and a lot of what Chief, uh, Jim Wright had to say about
23 agreements because we are the other side of all of the agreements that they talked about. The entire state of
24 California, if you will, I look at it in terms of a bunch of umbrellas that cover our relationship with local
25 government. We have upwards of 300 local agreements with local government fire departments for use in
26 the state. We have legislation that allows us to do this. Both the Economy Act, and
27 **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)** Act, and most importantly, the Reciprocal Fire Protection Act, serve us well and
28 has done so since 1955 in these agreements. These agreements spell out what our relationship is in terms

1 of automatic responses. When initial dispatch rolls down they talk about what our free period is between
2 each other, they talk about the rates of compensation with local government, and they establish operation
3 procedures, such as terms that you've heard before, closest forces concept, so that when we do mobilize,
4 we make sure we get the closest resource asset to the fire. So the three big ones for us are these local
5 agreements, the state Cooperative Fire Protection agreement, which is another very large umbrella that
6 covers the state, and then the last one that Dallas talked about is the California Fire Assistance agreement,
7 whereby the state of California, CDF, and the Forest Service, which we refer to at the forest agencies, can
8 reach into the state master mutual-aid system and, on a higher basis, pull those resources and bring those
9 resources to bear on our wild land fire problem. The key point here, regarding these agreements that we
10 have, is all of the agreements had been worked out well in advance. All the operating procedures are all in
11 place, there's nothing left that we have to do.

12 How do we mobilize these resources? Well, once again I am proud to say that I'm going to repeat
13 what Dallas Jones and Jim Wright had to say, and I'm proud because it shows that we have consistent
14 processes. We have such consistent processes that we share the same emergency command centers. But
15 this mobilization process is a national system of mobilization that's based on incident needs. The national
16 mobilization is a three-tiered process that starts with the incident and the local unit area that Jim talked
17 about, where requests come in to the local unit, the forest unit, eight or so of these local ECC's are
18 interagency with CDF, the remainder of those emergency command centers in the state are interagency
19 with other federal partners. Those resource orders are filled locally so that we get the closest resources to
20 the fire. If they can't be filled locally, they're bumped up to what we call the geographic areas, and we
21 have the same two geographic areas that CDF talked about, South **OPS**, Riverside, North **OPS**, Redding.
22 The difference here is that once resources are filled within the state and we do have the capability of
23 reaching outside the state for resources, and it goes to the National Coordination Center in
24 **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)** and we can reach out to 10 other geographic areas all over the United States and
25 bring what resources to bear, we need to deal with the issue.

26 Now I want to talk a little about barriers to the system. And barriers – you asked us to talk about
27 barriers regarding operational procedures, jurisdictional barriers that prevent expeditious use of resources,
28 and while we use the term barriers to discuss this, I'd like to think of them as maybe some additional

1 challenges that we and the fire service have to implement and to mobilize some of these resources and to
2 bring them to bear, and maybe even think of them as some extra steps that we have to go through. So
3 mobilization, I'm pretty happy to say that, I think mobilization barriers within the state of California went
4 away in the 1950's. There's no longer a brick wall between jurisdictions. People flow freely back and
5 forth between jurisdictions very easily.

6 Training issues with local government – you heard Dallas talk about the California incident
7 command system qualification program that's being developed in California. This training is very
8 important for our firefighters, and it's very difficult to get some of these remote fire departments the wild
9 land fire training that they need.

10 The active military – we have, the Forest Service has over 30 years of established history with the
11 use of MAFFS. They have over 20 years of really good quality experience using the military. Even today
12 annually we meet with the military and have after action reviews of how the year went, and today in Boise
13 we are meeting with the military and talking about how things went in '03, for the mobilizations that we
14 had in '03. So the service that the military provides us is very good. You couldn't ask for a higher, more
15 dedicated group of people. One of the problems that we have is the transient nature of the active military
16 service. And I'm not talking about the National Guard. But to keep up with the training component of the
17 active military, it's very difficult. Active military, a battalion, for example, takes up to seven days to train.
18 So the start up time is a long time to get the military mobilized. So it takes seven days from the time you
19 start to get them activated on a fire. Helicopters are a bit easier, but likewise, it takes about between three
20 to five days of start-up time. In the management of the helicopters, they're no different than any other
21 helicopter asset that requires the proper management for aviation safety, which means module leaders need
22 to be assigned to the aircraft, and we often times find ourselves short of module leaders to manage those
23 helicopters. The communications issues with the frequencies, you've heard about that, and just the
24 challenges of staying up to date with the training with the military.

25 The MAFFS – I think you've heard enough about the Economy Act issues. We're guided, we feel
26 we are guided by the Economy Act in the activation of the MAFFS and that we need to demonstrate in
27 some fashion where all of our civilian aircraft have been activated prior to pursuing the federal activation of
28 MAFFS. As you know, statewide we activated two, and nationally we activated six of the MAFFS. Again,

1 with MAFFS, I share this with you regarding the unique flight requirements of air tankers, and specifically
2 the unique flight requirements of the MAFFS program requires that they have qualified MAFFS lead planes
3 with them. Lead planes are those are tactical supervision modules that go out over the target, work in the
4 air tactical area, and provide safe target identification for those resources to make a good quality drops on
5 the fires. And when we assign a MAFFS lead plane to a MAFFS operation, it removes that lead plane from
6 other operations that it may be involved in. The critical flight paths and envelopes of MAFFS requires us
7 to do some separation with the aircraft, so it does require a little bit of additional effort to use those folks on
8 fires and make sure that we don't mix up the MAFFS aircraft with the contract aircraft on the same pieces
9 of line. Again, it takes a 24-hour minimum of activation, and there's a significant logistical set up
10 component, a costly component, that comes with that. However, a very, very quality operation, and like I
11 say annually we activate the MAFFS and are very pleased with the performance of the MAFFS.

12 We do have some recommendations that we would like to make for you.

13 DIRECTOR QUINTANAR: Well, we start with the first recommendation, but I think we've
14 probably talked about this one, but we have to bring this up again. Recognizing the important contributions
15 of private sector firefighting assets, review the language of the Economy Act to address mobilization and
16 military assets prior to depletion of commercial assets. Obviously that's a big one and that's one that we
17 really would like an answer to because we're – we think the opportunities of military assets are significant,
18 would be very beneficial, including transportation of personnel and equipment to and from incidents. The
19 next one that we have is utilize military technology to improve intelligence capabilities for real time
20 coordination. Focus logistics and precision operations. This again goes a little bit back to the Predator that
21 we tried to get a hold of, and I must say the efforts with that between Director Tuttle and Chief Zaragis,
22 OES, in our enthusiasm to do that, we came awful close. Now we did find out something, whether how
23 true that is or isn't, that the actual cameras are available on perhaps C130 National Guard units that are not
24 in this state, but made that same kind of capability that can give us 24-7 coverage. Our firefighters need to
25 know where they are, what's on the ground, where the fire's going, how they can get it in and out, and what
26 they have in front of them that are barriers, to be able to assist the public as well as protect, and structures,
27 as well as the other opportunities, that military technology may still be available to us that is no longer
28

1 classified. Again, trying to get information as quickly and immediately to the people on the ground or the
2 decision makers is extremely important for all of us.

3 The other recommendation similar but only on the private side, utilize science and technological
4 advancements to increase predictive capabilities. We talked about where's the fire going, what's it going to
5 do? It takes us a bit of time to actually predict where the fires will be, what's going to happen. Even in
6 extreme situations like this because we have fuel types that are very different. We have local conditions
7 that are different, and a lot of these fuels, fire had not burned in there for over 30 years, that we 're dealing
8 in a fuel type that is chemise and chaparral mainly in this environment that it thrives on fire, so it will
9 sprout from -- as a matter of fact we had fires on the Grant, or the old fire in the San Bernardino that last
10 year had burned through and this year little sprouts and the fire picked right up on that because it was so
11 dry it carried right on through the bigger, more vegetated plants that were out there.

12 Another recommendation is to provide fiscal capability to pre-position state and local resources
13 based on pre-set incident potential trigger points. We've talked about this before quite frequently with our
14 state and local partners, and the fiscal capability for us as feds to say, hey, can we put you on or this
15 weekend or the extra days, or move something here to be able to pay for that, would make a big difference
16 to help us all. Again, we have a fairly good sense of where or what's going to happen, obviously, but what
17 we showed you for what was going to happen last February, we didn't exactly know where to scale. But
18 we certainly know how to load up and move equipment and personnel. Quite often we do need some help
19 to be able to, uh, to pay for that.

20 Another recommendation, and this is a wonderful model, expand the mountain area safety task
21 force concept throughout the state. Now if you don't know what that is, that's a very intense group that
22 was started on the San Bernardino forest with a lot of people, local county fire, a lot of the communities
23 that really got together and decided that they do have an issue as far as potential fire. And what are they
24 going to do about it, and working together, they were able to come to some wonderful opportunities that
25 within a couple of hours, they were evacuating 30,000-plus people, and nobody died from that. There
26 weren't any car wrecks, or a lot of the other that was going on, but the communities and the state and local
27 fire, all the agencies working together in this continuous effort. Watching what these folks do, I mean, it's
28

1 weekends, it's at night, but the commitment that they have had, we think this mast concept is something we
2 certainly are going to push throughout our forest and the rest of the region.

3 Another recommendation is to increase at a multi-jurisdictional level our fuels projects through
4 collaboration with other agencies and the public on a landscape scale. Just going out there and doing for us
5 some kind of a fuels project, the removal of any fuels, really isn't enough. If we do that just on us, and it's
6 not done in the private sector as well, and around the homes, it's not going to help that much because the
7 homes are going to burn up, the homes are going to get spot fires, etc. We really need to work together in
8 the rural, urban environment areas, and work collaboratively as we never have done before.

9 And then another recommendation is to increase the collaboration with the insurance industry in
10 planning development efforts for the promotion of fire safe communities. The Simi fire was a good
11 example of where there some good building codes and fire safe communities where actually the people
12 could shelter within their home if they had to. Even though these fires, as dry as it was, were actually
13 burning as if you would look as through orchards and areas that normally will not burn, these homes, I do
14 believe there were no homes lost in that incident, and part of that was certainly because of the design of that
15 community. And certainly the credit goes to the fire departments that were there.

16 Increase the education and awareness of the fire hazards and responsibilities involved with living in
17 and around the urban interface. If you look at these places where a lot of us have lived and do live, and we
18 want that real quiet environment in the mountains, there's a price we pay for even being in this room. We
19 happen to be on an earthquake belt. And this is not a good room to be in if there's an earthquake. Under
20 this table or outside, that's where we need to be looking, but also need to accept the fact that with the public
21 that we have and where we live and the wonderful opportunities in the wild urban interface, there's a
22 responsibility that we all have to make sure our own homes are cleaned up and we can do something to
23 assist the fire personnel besides then just coming to us to rescue us. And then finally, and I think because
24 we live in a Mediterranean climate, and that means it's warm and hot for long periods of time, that we have
25 fire dependent eco-systems, that means that we have fuels that actually grow and thrive with fire. We have
26 35 million people. We need to really consider three areas that I think are all encompassing and this last
27 one, I think I'll add the other two with it. By encouraging building codes that result in fire safe
28 communities, as well as maintaining a strong fire service, and last, increasing our own focus to reduce

1 hazardous fuels on a landscape scale, we can really increase our success and efforts to protect our public as
2 well our own natural resources. And with that, Mr. Chair, we have completed our presentation.

3 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much, Director.

4 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Mr. Chairman?

5 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Are there – oh!

6 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Excuse me, I'd like to offer for the record –

7 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Oh, yes. Go ahead.

8 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** -- the military use handbook I think you'll find of value,
9 our MAFFS operation guide, and our national mobilization guide that will help with your effort in
10 understanding **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**.

11 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much. Questions from members of the committee? Thank
12 you, gentlemen, we appreciate your – one question, go ahead.

13 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Sorry. You're recommendations about building codes.
14 What are your thoughts on shake roofs?

15 DIRECTOR QUINTANAR: They burn real well. [Laughter.]

16 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Good kindling.

17 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** It's California's **(UNINTELLIGIBLE)**, but –

18 DIRECTOR QUINTANAR: Well, they, you there's other material. If you look at the Oakland
19 fire, the **PAINT** fire, if you look at the fire in Topanga Canyon, Laguna, and then you go on and look at the
20 Simi fire and you look at what they have for roofs, the tile, there's quite a difference. I do believe, for the
21 safety of our public and to cut cost to our public, fire personnel really ought to have the chance to be
22 fighting fire on homes that have tile roofs and fire safe environments to give them a chance as well. And I
23 don't think shake roofs are what we ought to be using.

24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Any other questions?

25 **(UNIDENTIFIED MALE SPEAKER):** Mr. Chairman, thank you. Much of the theme today has
26 focused on suppression capability and mobilization systems, and cooperative agreements, and barriers to
27 increasing suppression effectiveness. But each, Director Jones and Chief Wright and Fire Director
28 Quintanar, all said something that I thought bears our attention. We've heard from the chiefs about the

1 sheer mass of force that was brought to bear during this emergency. I know that there is no other state in
2 the union with more, more firefighters, more engines, more air tankers, more helicopters, and more of the
3 people to manage them. I think it's safe to say that worldwide there is no better example of mutual-aid, nor
4 a more sophisticated model of command and coordination than found here in California. The fire services
5 are justifiably proud to have an initial attack success rate of something approaching 99%, and they do it
6 safely. Especially, when we consider that this landscape is dominated by some of the most volatile fuels
7 found anywhere on earth, the chaparral-type that Director Quintanar talked about. It seems important that
8 we understand some of the common denominators of the very few fires that get away. Chief Wright talked
9 about the ten-year cycle. Bel Aire, 1960, Laguna, 1970, Panaroma, 1980, Oakland Hills, 1991, Malibu,
10 1993, and now this. In each case, drought, wind, and old brush or over-accumulated biomass predisposed
11 these conflagration events. We can't control drought or the Santa Ana's, but we can influence the fuels
12 complex. In a way, in my mind, this issue comes down to trying to match fire suppression capacity to ever-
13 accumulating fuels. And it's a race to the train crossing. For several years, fuels here have been
14 accumulating at a rate far, far greater than they've been treated. If we're not going to more aggressively
15 manage the fuels, I think the question for all of us is, how much better can initial attack get? How much
16 better than 99% can we get? Will more hardware, more air tankers, private or military, Predators, or even a
17 modified Economy Act, prevent the 10-year cycle, the Bel Aires, the Lagunas, the Panaromas, the Oakland
18 Hills, the Malibu, and now this. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much, and I think one of the things I would add to that is
20 that from each of those fires to which you referred, we have learned something, and we have put some of
21 that into action. But we've learned a lot more here from these fires, and unless we put them into action
22 we're going to have this kind of complication again. Go ahead, Supervisor.

23 SUPERVISOR HANSBERGER: I wanted to echo the comments that were just made and think
24 that we really need to focus, I think, a great deal on the issues that Chief Quintanar brought up and that
25 were just raised with respect to things other than the fire suppression activities. I frankly am incredibly
26 proud of the work that was done, and very appreciative of all of the communities that came to our aid. And
27 I think that the mast concept that we used in our mountain areas is something we need to all talk about, and
28 I'd like to put it on the future agenda to have a presentation as to why that made things work better there

1 than worked in our own valley where we had not applied the same techniques, and we need to improve our
2 performance in that regard. So let's talk about it. I think, finally, that our fuels management and taking a
3 look at our building standards are essential for the future. I do not think we can put enough engines and
4 firefighters in all the places to be as safe as we want to be, so we have to do a better job on the other side of
5 it and make things more resistant to fire and reduce the fuels. Now, that doesn't solve all the problems, but
6 I really believe that needs to be on our agenda for discussion and I think that is the track that will be most
7 productive in the near term. And by the way, I make this observation – while it wasn't true everywhere, in
8 our county it was particularly true – the new communities in Fontana and Rancho Cucamonga that were
9 just as threatened as San Bernardino were indeed new homes built with new standards in the last five to ten
10 years, and they didn't burn down. But the homes that we've lived in for 30 and 40 and 50 years have not
11 been hardened against fire, and they burned, and we just need to go back and look at our existing
12 communities. Not simply new homes, our existing communities, what can we do to harden them? Thank
13 you.

14 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Good point. Thank you, Dennis. Uh, any other questions? If not, thank
15 you very much, gentlemen. We have two more witnesses to testify. First of all Hal **MINTZ** from the
16 Property Owners Association of **[second tape ends, third tape beings]** the Disaster Service Coordinator,
17 thank you. Okay, go ahead, Hal, and then the Chief will come to you.

18 MR. **MINTZ**: Thank you. As introduced, my name is Hal **MINTZ**, I'm not head of any
19 association, so rather than add to that, I have to subtract from that. I'm just a property owner in the Lake
20 Arrowhead area. I've been a property owner there some 25 years, and prior to that for about 11 years in
21 Crestline, so I've been alternately fulltime and part-time resident up there. I know the area and virtually
22 every street in the mountains over a lifetime, it seems of being up there. I was very fortunate, among the
23 fortunate, my property was not touched. I didn't know that for awhile, leading, reading the various reports.
24 For at least three days I thought my house was gone. But fortunately it was not. However, I know a good
25 many people up there that were far less fortunate than I, and people I've known for many years and felt
26 very bad for them. And over the last couple of weekends I've been up in the mountains and I've talked to
27 quite a number of people, at the grocery market, the post office, and the village, and all through that. And
28 come up with a number of things that residents who experienced the fire seemed to have on their mind and

1 would probably be here to tell you if, number one if they knew that this even exists, and they do not, that's
2 one of the comments of the moment. So I felt a certain obligation to the people I spoke with, from my
3 unofficial survey, to come and tell you some of the things that are on the minds of the people that are there,
4 that went through some pretty horrendous experiences.

5 One would certainly think, listening to everything that I've heard the last four hours with this
6 marvelous array of expertise and power and resources, that a fire doesn't have a chance against all that I've
7 been hearing about the last four hours. But obviously it does have one hell of a chance, and with all that
8 was destroyed, it's fortunate that there still wasn't more. So, people will debate all the time on the half
9 empty, half full glass as to whether it was a marvelous job, or whether it was a bad job that so much was
10 done. That's not my topic at the moment. Let me just, because it's the end of the day, let me tell you a
11 few things that I picked up and experienced from some of my full and part-time neighbors in the area where
12 my home is, and some of the people that I talked with around the mountain area.

13 One thing that – and I made a couple of notes from what the people told me that I thought I should
14 bring to your attention. One, there seemed to be a pretty common thread on one particular point, and that
15 was evacuation. The majority of people that I talked to seemed to have some rather, thoughts of
16 inefficiency when it came to the matter of evacuating them. Most had never heard by any source
17 whatsoever to get out. Most of the people that did leave in time to not become casualties left, not because
18 of those who were charged with notifying people to evacuate, which I understand most people said were
19 done by sheriffs or different people going up and down a street with flashing red lights and a bullhorn,
20 which if they're elderly people or the shades are drawn, they don't hear, and they don't know about that
21 anyway. What really got out most of the people that would have otherwise been evacuated was when
22 Edison cut all the power. When the electricity went out they had no light, no refrigerator, no freezer, no
23 television, to see what was going on, they left more for that reason than because anybody had efficiently
24 evacuated areas that were right on top of the fire or close enough to it to be in danger. So one suggestions
25 would be to perhaps take a look at whether there are more efficient and more direct methods of evacuation.
26 I talked to one lady who told me she was 87 years of age, was in an area that was supposed to be evacuated,
27 that stayed there all through the fire never left. And I asked her why not? She said, well I had no way to
28 communicate with anybody, didn't know until I saw that everybody was gone. I don't drive a car, I had no

1 way out. How would I get out of my house? So she said she stayed there with no power, no electricity,
2 called all the phone numbers she knew how to call, got only busy signals, and ate food out of her
3 refrigerator a week after there was no power and wondered whether she poisoned herself. She was very
4 concerned about the inefficiency of evacuation processes. So I forward that one on to you. By the way,
5 just a minor thing, while I was up, I guess last weekend, an automated phone call through to my home there
6 from the Edison Company, indicating that due to high winds they may turn off power. They didn't. But
7 that – it had nothing to do with the fires. But just an indication that if they can do automated things, and
8 someone told me they did 30,000 of them, I would think that fire resources could set up a similar telephone
9 system to notify people telephonically that they should get out, rather than wait for someone to come by
10 with a bullhorn and a light that they neither hear no see. So evacuation was one issue.

11 Another one that people talked about quite a bit was the matter that I know all of you are infinitely
12 aware of, and that's the bark beetle dead trees up in and around the area. As I'm sure you all know, besides
13 the ones that are in the natural forest area, the ones that, should it reach a residential area, like Lake
14 Arrowhead and it did reach the residential areas of parts of Cedar Glen and Waterman Canyon, and I'm
15 sure all those dead trees provided -- someone used the phrase earlier today – great kindling to spread those
16 fires and cause a great deal of destruction. Why are the dead trees there? Why aren't they gone? I talked
17 to a number of homeowners and they said, no one gives us appropriate information as to whether we can
18 afford to take those trees out or not. And so we leave them there. We love to take them out, but we don't
19 know necessarily are we ever going to get a rebate back from any governmental agency? Edison, the word
20 some people had heard, will give a rebate back. No one seems to know how much or how long it will take
21 them. Edison won't tell us. I've called Edison personally and asked them those questions. Can't get any
22 answers. Well, maybe three months, maybe four months. What percentage? Oh, well, we don't know that
23 yet, we'll let you know about that time. I took out six trees off my properties, not by the way a high
24 number compared to how many of these residents needs to take. My bill, and it was the lowest of three
25 estimates, was \$7,500 to take out my six bark beetle dead trees. Well, I can afford \$7,500, I did that. I
26 have two neighbors of mine, they're fulltime residents, and I asked them about it – I haven't got that kind
27 of money. Where am I going to get that kind of money? So they leave the dead trees there. If a fire breaks
28 out again, similar to it, and if it goes over to that particular area, it will be another Cedar Glen or another

1 Waterman Canyon. The thought being that maybe something should be done, or a recommendation out of
2 a committee like this, or maybe even legislation, or maybe even just information that people don't have,
3 that maybe there are ways that people without the ability to write a check for \$7,500 -- or \$10,000, some
4 have more trees than I did – where are they going to get the money? Is there a way to do that? Is there a
5 way to get that out? Is there a loan, a governmental thing? People don't know, and I'm sure there are
6 answers to these questions. But the residents in these dangerous areas, very dangerous areas, very lift-
7 threatening areas, do not know this information. They just don't know it. I'm sure it exists, but
8 somebody's not notifying them. And I certainly think that something should be done a little bit better so
9 that you don't have quite the situation that you just had in October.

10 Utility lines – because of things that have just come up through the mountain areas, and I don't
11 know how it affects non-mountain areas, but we do have trees, both dead ones and live, all through the
12 mountain area, and those of you that are familiar with it, and I know some of you are, maybe most of you
13 are, you've got these utility lines running all in between these trees, some of them touching the branches,
14 all through the mountain area, just waiting to have a greater problem should it happen next time around,
15 and I'm sure some problems already occurred, that if the fires hit the trees and the bushes and go up 50, 60
16 feet, which seems to be nothing, they'll hit all those power lines, I sure they have in some areas. People are
17 nervous about it, particularly if they see those power lines out near their homes and several, when I said I
18 was coming to this meeting said, will you tell them we're worried about these power lines. Can't they do
19 underground power lines in fire dangerous areas, or things like that to increase their chance of survival?
20 And essentially, one other factor that was a pretty common theme among people I talked to was that no
21 governmental agency that they know of, or has reached them, seems to make them aware of just what they
22 should know or deal with when they deal with their insurance companies. I'm talking about people that
23 have suffered a considerable loss. They don't know, they feel they're totally at the mercy of insurance
24 companies they feel probably have a great responsibility to keeping their insurance company's costs down.

25 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Mr. **MINTZ**, John Giramendi, the Insurance Commissioner, is hold a series
26 of hearings on the particular issue of the insurance issue. We may look at it at a periphery basis, but we're
27 letting him handle the insurance problems.

28

1 MR. MINTZ: I'm delighted to hear that. And I might just say one thing, as I close, the
2 information and the hearings of things mean very little to Joe and Josephine Residents if they don't know
3 about them. And this meeting here, a case in point. I only know about this meeting and probably that's the
4 reason why I'm a lonely resident here, I learned about this because I know one of you up on the panel who
5 told me we had a hearing here. Otherwise I would not have known. And I read the papers each day that
6 would be affecting the mountain residents. The San Bernardino Sun had no story, or anything talking about
7 your commission, or even that it exists, or that there's a meeting today. The Mountain News and Crestline
8 Courier, I get all those daily. There's been nothing in any of those. Now I did learn today, I know it to be a
9 fact, that your committee did send out press releases to all of the people who perhaps should have done
10 that, but as many of you know from your other lives in politics and activities, that when people in the media
11 get press releases, very often they look at them and say, well, that's an announcement to me that if I want to
12 go cover the story, I go to it. It's not necessarily a request that they put it in the paper so that their readers
13 will know about the meetings. And if there is going to be insurance information out that would help people
14 how to deal with what they must deal with, or other kinds of information about meetings where you can get
15 some input if you wanted it, then I would suggest that something a little stronger and little more direct be
16 done to reach the citizenry. Just one other thing that sometimes occurs, even to ask one of the utility
17 companies, when they put out their bills, if they would insert something about any information, save the
18 budgeting of a special publication. All kinds of ways to do it, that's only one. And again, I'm thrilled to
19 see this committee, and when they say Blue Ribbon, you certainly are that, and you certainly are gathering
20 tremendous amounts of information and I know that there's a tremendous degree of sincerity to see that
21 what happened before may not happen again, and certainly to do things as well as you can possibly do.
22 And I appreciate that as one, but I felt that some of these thoughts of people I spoke to, I felt duty bound to
23 convey them to you and I thank you for your courtesy.

24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you very much, Hal. Mr. Walters. Are you the Fire Chief, or are
25 you just the Director of Homeland Security for the tribes?

26 MR. WALTERS: No, I'm, uh, my name's Chris Walters, I'm the Disaster Services Coordinator
27 for San Manuel, I'm representing our Fire Chief, he was unable to make it today.

28 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Okay, thank you for being here.

1 MR. WALTERS: San Manuel Reservation, for those of you who aren't aware of us, we're just to
2 the northeast of San Bernardino city, roughly 10 miles from here. We sit at the base of the San Bernardino
3 Mountains. So at the fire went through at 9:00 in the morning through Waterman Canyon, it hit our
4 reservation roughly about 7:00 in the evening, it finally came to the reservation. We had done evacuations,
5 we have a casino facility, and evacuated out complete facilities and our reservation by 2:00 in the
6 afternoon, five hours prior to coming on the reservation. Along with Supervisor Hansberger, we're very
7 gracious and thankful of the support and the response that we had to assist us with the fire. The fire did
8 burn completely through our reservation. Of the 650 acres – it's a small reservation – we estimate over 630
9 of those acres burned, that we lost our natural resources and a lot of our ground cover. So one of the things
10 I would like to discuss is the mitigation. Working not only during the disaster here, but a little closer
11 mitigation with the tribes. We're very concerned with the land up above us in the United States Forest
12 Service. We're clearing the debris up on our reservation, we've already spent \$400,000 on clearing our
13 debris through a creek that we feel will be impacted. But we're very concerned with the flood control
14 channel that belongs to the county within the city of San Bernardino. And the Forest Service, the property
15 up above the reservation flowing through there and backing up. Historically we've had two mud slides and
16 floods from this channel. There's no mitigation funds currently that we've been able to come up with.
17 We've met with FEMA, the money's not there to help with the city, it's off the reservation. But those are
18 some of the problems that not only our tribe is going to face, but a lot of the other tribes, the San Diego
19 tribes, the nine tribes that were impacted down there. So we're a little concerned about that. Mutual-aid
20 agreements were kind of brought up. The tribes, as the tribes have been growing, they haven't been
21 included in the California master mutual-aid agreement.

22 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Do they want to be included?

23 MR. WALTERS: You know, and actually the tribes would be. They would like to be consulted,
24 but not through the BIA but through their sovereignty as a government. And we've organized, two years
25 ago or three years ago, we organized Southern California Tribal Emergency Management Consortium,
26 which consisted of San Diego, San Bernardino and Riverside tribes. There's actually 15 fire departments
27 within those three counties. There's five truck companies, three more coming next year. Tribes have a lot
28 of resources. We have two Type 1 engines, we have a Hazmat team, we have a paramedic program on our

1 reservation, and the other tribes have resources now also. I helped with the pilot project that FEMA funded
2 during this past six months and we met, throughout the whole state, 107 tribes to determine what type of
3 resource capabilities they have. There are still tribes at (UNINTELLIGIBLE) don't have telephones or
4 electrical power on half their reservation. There're some very poor tribes. All the tribes aren't gaming
5 tribes. You know, they need resources. Coyote Valley, they have an old rundown fire engine. You know,
6 the could use surplus engines that come out of L.A. county instead of sending them down to Mexico.
7 Maybe we need to think about some of the tribal nations that are right here in California, the 107 tribes.

8 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Is that the total number in the state?

9 MR. WALTERS: There's 107 federally recognized tribes.

10 MS. DELGADO: Actually it's 109, but we have two tribes that both have a portion of their
11 reservation in California. But, one in Nevada and one in Arizona.

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you.

13 MR. WALTERS: As the fire went through our reservation, we were very fortunate. We have strict
14 building codes on the reservation that were adopted a few years back, and we do have all stucco homes and
15 tile roofs, and we didn't lose a single home on our reservation. But like I said, 630 acres burned, we had
16 30' to 50' clearance, actually up to 200' clearance around some of the homes, and it paid off. The tribes'
17 investment in their property paid off. Some of the other tribes weren't as fortunate, and that brings me to
18 emergency management with the tribes. We discussed earlier the Incident Command System and SIMS.
19 When we did these workshops with the tribes these past six months, that's a whole new concept to a lot of
20 the tribes. They've never heard of ICS. ICS has been around since 1980, early '80's. And same with
21 SEMS, it became law '96 in the state of California. Tribes weren't aware of that. There wasn't a
22 collaborative working relationship between those, and I just encourage that we open those relationships up.
23 There's programs – grants – such as Emergency Management Performance grant that the state of California
24 accepts. Tribes can be sub grantees, but when tribes try to apply for it, they're told, sorry, can apply in
25 your operational area. If you'd like funding, you can apply as a special district for funding for your
26 emergency plans, for your EOC's, for any additional training. So the tribes aren't receiving the training,
27 they haven't received it in the past, and they're still set aside.

28 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Whom do you apply in those areas for those?

1 MR. WALTERS: EMPG comes from FEMA. That brings me to Homeland Security. Tribes
2 haven't been included in Homeland Security. We were told earlier that there will be set aside funds for
3 Homeland Security. Well that's because the tribes weren't included. The state failed to include the tribes
4 in Homeland Security. So what the tribes have done is funded themselves, the tribes that have the money.
5 But a lot of the tribes, they don't have communications and as you go through San Diego, you'll see that
6 was probably one of the big problems.

7 CHAIR CAMPBELL: That's certainly something we can look into.

8 MR. WALTERS: The San Diego tribes did not have the communications or the capabilities, and
9 the relationship. When we held the workshops, we had, uh, Riverside County has been very active with all
10 the workshops, San Diego County wasn't.

11 CHAIR CAMPBELL: How many tribes were impacted down here in southern California by the
12 fires?

13 MR. WALTERS: There were at least 9 tribes in San Diego.

14 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Did they lose any –

15 MS. DELGADO: There were – excuse me – there were approximately 11 tribes that were
16 impacted with the fires.

17 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Was there loss of any homes?

18 MR. WALTERS: Yes, actually, the San **PASQUALE** reservation lost all but one home. Sixty-
19 seven homes they lost out of 68.

20 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Now, they're eligible for FEMA benefits, right, and they're all the –

21 MR. WALTERS: They are eligible. Uh, they're having some problems with some of the renters
22 that were on tribal lands.

23 MS. DELGADO: Can I just clarify something, Chris? It depends on the land that the homes were
24 on. Some land is trust land, and some land is fee land. If it's on fee land, then they may not qualify for
25 FEMA. And these are some of the problems that the tribes have. But if they –

26 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Excuse me, Ms. Delgado, I'm not familiar with the term you're using.

27 MS. DELGADO: Well, it's a different kind of land. If it's a land that's held in trust –

28 CHAIR CAMPBELL: I know the trust land, what's the other land?

1 MS. DELGADO: Fee land.

2 CHAIR CAMPBELL: F-E-E?

3 MS. DELGADO: Right. And that's where the tribe has purchased that land. But it may not be
4 held into trust. That land may not be covered. And so homes on that land may not be covered by FEMA.
5 So those are some of the issues that we're trying to deal with, still.

6 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you.

7 MR. WALTERS: So it's fairly complex. There were, uh, I had heard rumors of up to eight lives
8 that were lost at **BARONA**, the **BARONA** reservation, possibly 30 homes in **BARONA**. I think
9 **RENCON** lost 30 to 40 homes, the **RENCON** reservations. There's quite a bit of damage in the San
10 Diego tribes. La Jolla was impacted, lost a lot of their agriculture area through La Jolla reservation, which
11 is close to **JULIAN**. It's not La Jolla beach.

12 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Well the bill that hopefully will get passed on Monday will provide help to
13 farmers with their agriculture land.

14 MR. WALTERS: So really, some of the things we've seen – there's been adequate funding for the
15 tribal nations of California to deal with emergency management, and the state has tried to help us the past
16 year, but one year's, uh, it's tough to cram it into one year for all the tribes to develop their response plans
17 and their mitigation plans, and it's been a lot for a lot of the tribes, and what I'd like to see is just,
18 encourage continued funding for the tribes. To catch up, and collaboration to work with the tribes, the
19 county, the state, and the federal government, to work with the tribes and to not take the grant money to the
20 state, let the state take it. And if it – maybe it's having a representative at the NEMA level. There's no
21 tribal representative up at NEMA, the NEMA level. Maybe that's what it's going to take. But there needs
22 to be tribal inclusion. There's just too many people that visit tribal lands and too much to protect on the
23 tribal properties in California. You know, I just want to thank you for letting me speak.

24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: We appreciate your being here, Chris. Thank you very much. I want to
25 thank everyone of you for your participation today. The comments and discussions have been most helpful
26 in gaining an understanding of our wild land and wild land urban firefighting capabilities, and we have
27 established a good foundation on which to continue our review of the recent fire siege in southern
28 California. I look forward to our next hearing on January 7, 2004 in Ventura. Over the next few weeks we

1 will be contacting organizations and individuals for their participation at that meeting. Again, the January
2 7th hearing will focus on pre-fire management and fuel reduction programs, as well as the status of past
3 recommendations and efforts being undertaken to prevent major fire disasters from occurring, or for
4 improving our firefighting capabilities. Ladies and gentlemen, this is the last meeting for the commission
5 this year, and to everyone I extend a Happy Chanukah, a Merry Christmas, and a very Happy New Year.
6 This meeting stands adjourned. Thank you all.

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